11

Black Power Politics as Social Movement: Dialectics of Leadership in the Campaign to elect Harold Washington Mayor of Chicago

Gerald McWorter, Doug Gills
and Ron Bailey

Introduction

The election of Harold Washington was a great victory for the black community. This was a case of successful political protest rather than merely conventional institutionalized political behaviour. The Washington campaign became a crusade in the black community and, therefore, its implication for the future has as much to do with the development of the black liberation movement as it does with the routine organization of behaviour within the established political system. An explosion of black political protest is best understood in the context of a social movement mode of analysis. This is a fundamental issue of perspective, because the absence of the social movement paradigm from much of the current literature can lead one to make false judgments about the nature of black politics.

The social movement paradigm focuses on the social behaviour of an aggregate of individuals mobilized outside
tions to use resources to make a change in McAdams, 1982; Freeman, 1983; Oberschall, arthy, 1979). The electoral behavior model uses are used for formal political participa-

ent approach sets a broad context in which your constitutes only one of the many forms of action (McAdam, 1983). Since protest social movements are 'normal' by blacks more so than by whites in the Washington campaign in this way can white differences in voter registration and 73). Our analysis focuses on militant protest in this contributed to the election of May 1965).

There is another aspect of black protest 'outside' the political system which is rooted in the dual traditions of black nationalism and socialist radicalism. There exist a number of small, loosely-related organizations which maintain a highly ideological political style of activity. Because of the intense development of cadre in this type of protest politics, there is the latent potential for protest groups to provide leadership for relatively large groups of people, such as that which occurs in the mobilization phase of a protest movement. Furthermore, these groups often have a 'vanguard' quality which enables them to start movement activity before it becomes popular, to 'risk' legitimacy by disrupting the existing norms of the political order (Geschwender, 1971).

In sum, we can make a distinction between political 'insiders' and 'outsiders', and we can identify 'elites', rooted in institutionalized, high status social positions. This chapter is an investigation of these leadership differences in the campaign to elect Harold Washington as mayor of Chicago. Our analysis will focus on three questions: (1) Did a dual leadership of insiders and outsiders exist in the campaign? (2) How did this develop? And (3) What did the outsiders contribute through the political tactics of black social protest?

Dual Leadership

This model conceptualizes black community dual leadership in the campaign to elect Washington as a development process contributing to three time-specific events: the announcement of candidacy, the primary, and the general election. The significance of these three black political victories can be seen by comparing black and white electoral participation. The degree of difference can be observed by looking at the 1979 and 1983 mayoral results. Table 11.1 demonstrates that black electoral superiority had developed by 1982 and expressed itself in the Washington mayoral votes in 1983. This upsurge in black voting was an expression of black protest leadership. Figure 11.1 depicts the process of movement of dual leadership as it has developed historically in the politics of Chicago's black community and as it directly relates to the three focal events of the 1983 mayoral election. Central to the process is the relative conver
first around identification of the key political issues and second, the selection of a candidate — Harold Washington. Then this convergence of leadership culminated in the victories of the primary and general election in Chicago. Other aspects of the figure are the relative divergence of 'insider-outsider' leadership based upon differences in real or perceived interests of various leaders and their constituencies. When the black community was under racist attack, there was greater and more sustained unity which overcame the divergence of interests.

Also indicated in the model, are the specific organizational forms that the insider-outsider leadership dialectic manifested within the Washington campaign. The Steering Committee and Transition Team organizations are the formal structures of the campaign and the Task Force organization and its networks into the community represent the informal aspects that tie the movement to the formal political system, etc.3

Organization of the Campaign

The critical juncture occurred with the establishment of a formal and an informal campaign apparatus — the organization of campaign leadership on an insider-outsider basis. The outsiders were necessary to give the campaign a strike force of activists willing to use militant tactics if necessary. Chicago is a machine town, full of gangsters, including large black institutionalized street gangs. Within the black community, the 'outsider' leadership group came together as the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment (Task Force). Its major role was to defend the unity of the black community in support of Washington's candidacy.

Many of the individuals and organizations that united in the Task Force had been working together for a long time. The largest group of loosely coordinated organizations and individuals is called 'The African Community of Chicago' (ACC). It is based on a black nationalistic/Pan Africanist ideological orientation. They annually sponsor Kwanzaa (a black alternative to Christmas) which draws over 1,000 people, and African Liberation Day in late May, which annually draws over 250 people. This represents the institutionalization of black culture (rituals of resistance) initiated in the 1960s. Typical groups include: Shule YaToto (a black independent school), Institute of Positive Education), and the Association of African Historians.
Table 11.2: Organisation of Leadership in the Harold Washington Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force</th>
<th>Date Formed</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Gap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>-8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>+8.4</td>
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<td>87.2</td>
<td>82.2</td>
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<td>89.1</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>+5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Gap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>+1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>+0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>+5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Date Formed: November 7, 1982 (publicly announced January 10, 1983)
Membership: 95
Leading Figures:
1. Robert Starks, Associate Professor, Centre for Inner City Studies, Northeastern Illinois University
2. Conrad Worrill, Associate Professor, Centre for Inner City Studies, Northeastern Illinois University
3. Lu Palmer, Adjunct Professor, Urban Studies, Associated, Colleges of the Midwest

% Black: 100%
Purpose: To help elect Harold Washington by mobilising Black unity and using tactics that the regular campaign could not carry out.

Steering Committee
Date formed: December 13, 1982
Membership: 62
Leading Figures:
1. Bill Berry, Special Assistant to the President, Johnson Products Company
2. Warren Bacon, Manager of Community Relations, Inland Steel Company
3. Walter Clark, Vice President, First Federal Savings and Loan
% Black: 71%
Purpose: To provide overall policy and planning, and to develop financial and political resources for the campaign.

Transition Team
Date formed: April, 1983
Membership: 90
Leading Figures:
1. Bill Berry, Special Assistant to the President, Johnson Products Company
2. James O'Connor, President and Chairperson, Commonwealth Edison
3. Norman Ross, Senior Vice President, 1st National Bank of Chicago
4. Kenneth Glover, Vice President, South Shore Bank
% Black: 39.7%
Purpose: To analyse and prepare recommendations for a new mayoral administration; city budget, administrative structure, policy and key personnel appointments, etc.
Coalition for Black Trade Unionists. In wide and ideological ACC, most of these local neighbourhoods and pragmatically and welfare reforms on a step-by-step, the ACC maintains a small group of highly adherents, while the reformers deal with based on the day-to-day needs of their reformers are united into working class actions that cut across nationality and race. and Nancy Jefferson (MCC) share leadership actions like the Chicago (housing) Rehab est coalitions like People Organized for Reic Reform (POWER). These coalitions link side leadership, especially whites like Slim Jptown Coalition serving the interests of whites. A third bloc of community forces Palmer, the head of Chicago Black United discussed below.

Identifiable blocs were black ministers, doctors, other city-wide organizations, and others and entrepreneurs have small congregations and are openly sympathetic to nationalist ans were from 12 wards. They were either holders or aspiring candidates with no main (Regular Democratic Party) support. Hence, little by being in this 'outside' leadership elected and consolidating a ward organizapect this open affiliation with outsiders to candidates stopped participating after the both the winners and losers. The Marxists tile soil in the context of black militancy, but and since the groups were hardly represented observer/activist. These groups were the USA), the League of Revolutionary Struggle leagues, and two independent black Marxist city-wide organizations did as much as the they all worked together so closely that en unsure of which group they were working seemed only to know what they were working of Chicago’s first black mayor, Harold organization was the CBUC headed by Lu

Palmer, the other was PUSH headed by Reverend Jesse Jackson. These two were headquartered in the First Congressional District represented by Harold Washington. The critical factor was that each organization had powerful personalities for leaders who had been frequently at odds, between each other, and with Washington. However, in this context, there was a contagious rapprochement spreading because the possibility of a black mayor was something all of them wanted. The nationalists began to unite with Jesse Jackson. Lu Palmer and Jesse made up and Lu began to speak on the PUSH Saturdays morning radio broadcasts. Reformers began working with the nationalists, etc. The historical moment created this militancy black unity of ‘outsiders,’ and this unity helped the moment have a magical quality people could believe in.

The development of ‘insider’ leadership took place on two fronts. First, a Steering Committee was organized for broad policy planning, development of financial resources, and for establishing legitimacy with the multiple constituencies represented by its ‘blue ribbon’ members who cut across racial, nationality, class, gender, and geographical lines. A second aspect was the organization of a campaign staff, a campaign manager and office workers who would handle policy implementation and coordinate the day-to-day activities of the campaign. This staff was an interesting combination of movement volunteers with utopian visions of political reform, operatives from machine-style political backgrounds along with reformers who wanted to move from the ‘outside’ (community) toward the ‘inside’ (City Hall administration, key board appointments).

The organization of formal campaign leadership began with close associates of Harold Washington being pulled together as staff, led by Renault Robinson as the campaign manager. Robinson had a well-known history of leadership in the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League (AAPL) (McCory 1977). More recently (1980) he had been appointed to a term of the Chicago Housing Authority Board by Mayor Byrne as a concession to the black community. However, at that time, the campaign lacked organizational coherence — no research, no media plan and projection. There was a breakdown in internal and external communication, weak office staff coordination and poor space (initially occupying offices of the AAPL in a South Side black community). But within a month after announcing his candi-
pulled together a 'blue ribbon' Steering
aged campaign managers. Al Raby was
a manager and by, 7 January 1983, he had
work for running a professional campaign
the downtown. The latter move provided
ess to media outlets, transport outlets, facili-
and city-wide volunteers. This move facili-
istinct offices across the city.
key groups on the Steering Committee. A
from the 1960s, and leading reformers from
from the campaign from the 1970s and early
Committee was headed by Bill Berry who
in the 1960s. Berry was the head of the
when it grew to be the largest chapter in
neted its budget and gained mainstream
's rejection of black militants and through his
ionship to the major Chicago corporations
was a key link between white mainstream
black elites and, even in his seventies, he
tlevision talk show.
ch person, Harold Baron, worked for bill
League's director of research. Baron was a
progressive intellectuals and university
a campaign manager, was the former head of
ouncil of Community Organizations (CCCO).
de was the largest such coalition in the USA.
ed unity with diverse groups (for example,
SNCC). It sponsored Martin Luther King,
into Chicago, and CCCO led the nation's
ests — the two boycotts of Chicago public
63 and February 1964) (Rivera, McWorter
64). Warren Bacon, a division manager of
School Board during the boycotts. And,
osed the dominant, reactionary interests on
's Daley's control. In this period, Bacon
Berry. Bacon now serves on the Illinois
ication.
selected the two leading blacks in trade
positions. They are part of the 1970s-1980s
Charles Hayes, International Vice President
od and Commercial Workers International
Wyatt, Vice President of the Coalition of

Labor Union Women. Others include: Nancy Jefferson, Executive
Director of the Midwest Community Council; Artensa
Randolph, Chair of the Advisor Council of the Chicago Housing
Authority; Danny Davis, an independent City Council member;
Juan Soliz, Latino independent candidate for the City Council;
and Jorge Morales, Latino minister and community activist.

Other members of the initial Steering Committee group
included three representatives from the business community:
Lerone Bennett, an internationally famous writer with Johnson
Publishing Company; Ed Gardner, President of Soft-Sheen
Cosmetic Company; and Walter Clark, Vice President of First
Federal Saving and Loan (second largest in Chicago). Clark also
served as treasurer for the Steering Committee. Lastly, there
were three progressive whites: Robert Mann, lawyer, former
state legislator; Robert Hallock, lawyer; and Rebecca Sive-
Tomashesky, Executive Director, Playboy Foundation. Also, a
number of the leaders were bankers whose main role was to
raise money.

The organization of the campaign was difficult precisely
because the leadership had to deal with vastly different sets of
expectations. The mainstream demand was that the future
mayor and campaign organization be acceptable to all aspects of
the Chicago community, especially whites and business inter-
est. This was quite different from the black demand that far-
reaching reforms be advocated by aggressively pitting black
power advocacy against the white racism and machine
dominance of the Democratic Party. In general, this is the
contrast between the insider rightward pull of mainstream
institutional politics and the outsider leftward pull of black
people mobilized into a protest movement. In this context,
outsiders were at the point of political production, fighting for
votes, for more status. On the inside, however, people were
respected more for their social station in life. Status was fixed to
rather stable occupational and political roles. This sets the basis
for the outsiders' rise and fall in status, because once their
'production' of votes was no longer needed, they experienced a
rapid decline in status.

After the primary victory it was necessary to make definite
decisions about planning a new Washington administration
prepared to take over control of the City Hall. This posed a new
problem because running a large government bureaucracy and
managing a diverse legislative body requires different skills
ior mobilizing voters, especially when black against a white racist vote, but would not work running the entire city administration. A Transition Team modelled after the lliterate succession of presidential administra-

tion was composed of 300 people. Only with the composition of leading bodies Team and the leadership of the various ach number 90 people. The main division of was into a 25-member Financial Advisory Fact Force) and a 65-member Transition xee.

arizes the social character of each leadership sider-outside axis, the Task Force and the demonstrated opposite tendencies in the s. The Transition Team had somewhat more acter, but quite significant was the outsider isk Force (63.4). Both the Steering Committee Team were dominated by elites. About three-organizations were business, professional or this diverged sharply from the predominantly ity and labour) composition of the Task Force.

Character of Leadership Organizations in ncoln Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>(1)%</th>
<th>(2)%</th>
<th>(3)%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blk. Ministers</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blk. Business</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Elites</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: (1) Task Force (N = 16); (2) Steering Committee (N=46); (3) Transition Team (N = 65).

Source: Official records and documents from each committee.

The Task Force is different in one additional way, namely, the reliance on the more independent small business person and the academic professional. These middle class positions allow for greater relative freedom, both on the job and in getting time away from the job. On the other hand, the Steering Committee was dominated by larger businesses and professionals in large bureaucratic agency settings that discipline the leaders within ideological and political limits defined by the political mainstream.

Overall, there is a great deal of significance in the percentage of black people in each leadership group: Task Force (100 per cent); Steering Committee (71 per cent) and Transition Team (39.7 per cent). This pattern of declining black composition rather accurately parallels the percentage of black people in the relevant reference group being served. The Task Force was for building unity in the black community, so it was 100 per cent black while the steering Committee was for Washington's broad electoral support. His vote in the general election was 77 per cent black, while the steering Committee was 71 per cent black. Washington maintained a proportionate per cent black of all leadership groups in his campaign. This is also reflected in the composition of blacks in the Transition Team leadership. Blacks comprised 39.7 per cent of the leading positions which coincides
in the city population (39.8 in 1980).

s are quite different in terms of the bureau-
individual resources being organized. The
people organized group mainly based on an
ness to contribute personal resources to a
As in most social movement contexts, the
herselves and gain status in the movement
ich they live up to the expectations of the
lose status when they cease to function. The
bers came from organized institutional
ense, they represented themselves as well as
ey derived their status as much from their
the performance in the role assigned. The
was mixed in this regard. The top leader-
Committee consisted of institutional élites
form public recognition, while the expanded
re (consisting of a number of citizens
ed for a great deal of formal and informal co-
ral co-optation on some subcommittees
or like the Task Force where status was a
ance: 'What have you done lately?' is the
ese contexts.

erconnection between these three leadership
overlapping membership as is shown in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>% Black</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1,099,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2,185,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3,376,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>3,620,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>3,366,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>3,003,072</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Based on the Index of Residential Dissimilarity, Chicago is one of the most segregated cities in the USA. This score was 92.1 in 1950 and it has slowly increased to 93.0 by 1980.

Out of this segregated social world, developed a black middle class in control of increasing resources (for example, education and skills, income, businesses, access to facilities and personnel, organizations and associations). Those resources were used to fuel the black liberation protest movement. In 1950 there were 10,065 blacks in Chicago with at least a college education and, by 1980, this number had increased to over 47,000. But blacks did not make great gains in positions of power. The Chicago Urban League carried out a study of blacks in top decision-making positions in 1967 and 1977. The overall pattern is found in Table 11.6 (Fox et al. 1980).
Table 11.6, that blacks are overweeningly in both the public (government) and private representation and improvement has taken sector. The public sector is much more sensitive to the demands of the black protest needs the potential political resources of that race. It needs votes to continue to maintain them seems to be that small electoral districts populations tend to be represented well. This is the Black Power Batting Average for City Council (figure 11.2).

The Batting Average is computed by dividing the number of the City Council by the percentage black population. Elsinger calls this a 'black representation ratio' (Karnig and Welch 1980). Figure 11.2: Black Power Batting Average for Chicago, the number of black representatives in the major indication of the developing capacity of society to mobilize resources to elect blacks to the racial character of many public policies, it would be expected that black council voters blocs, particularly with regard to vote for the black electorate.

Graphically portrays the pattern of post-First political representation. There are three
2. Education
Black representation
on Board of
Education
struggle for democratic
control over education.

3. Public Housing
Black representation
distorted by Byrne on
CRA Board. Conditions
in public housing
worsening.

4. Smearer
Campaign:
17th Ward
(Politics)
Byrne attempted to
smear Smearer for
opposing her appoint-
ment of James Roose-
to school board.

5. Black
Businesses
and Jobs
Undermining the
status issue of
black representation
were issues of in-
equality of job and
career opportunities for
blacks.

6. Unemploy-
ment.
Welfare
The economic crisis
and the Reagan-
Thompson budget
cuts represent a
direct attack on the
standard of living.

7. CD Fund
Reappraisal
(Private
Housing)
A large percent of
Federal Community
Development Funds
were retained to
support man-line
publicists and
patronage as well as
investments in Central
Business Districts.

8. Health
Democratizing health
services and facilities.
Problem becomes more
critical as costs in
health service increase.

Cook County Hospital.
Black community leaders
and health professionals
and health activists.

Black community leaders
and health professionals
and health activists.

Parent Equalizers
CBUC-led mass struggles
SUHS Coalition provided
popular exposure through
newspaper.

150,000 families made
in CHA housing develop-
ments. Over 95% are
black. 75% of families
are headed by women.
2/3 are on public
assistance.

State officials are
brought in to hear
local community
testimony 1979, 1980.

1979-80, mass protests
against a drive are
launched. During 1982
CBUC leads a coalition
to Byrne’s appointment
of two whites to Board
replacing blacks.

Stirring series of
protest actions
exercised during
spring/summer 1982
leading to arrest of
many leading activists.

Chicago Housing
Tenants organization and
other tenant
communities active.

The 17th Ward is 97%
black and voting against
machine positions and
opposed to “platanization”
politics.

CBUC joined forces with
other Ward community
groups to oppose Byrne.
They were joined by
other white reformers.

(May-July 1982)
With the support of a
black-led citywide
coalition, Smearer
defeated Byrne’s candi-
date in the primary
and runoff.

Supporting the Chicago
Fest protest was a
broad coalition within
the black community
and citywide. Key
organization was
PUH, CBUC.

(August 1982)
A 14 day boycott of
Chicago Fest led by
Coalition to Stop Chicago
Fest and supported by
white labor
“Committee of 500”.

POWER spearheaded by
community activists
across the city. At
all-Chicago Summer
Congress held in
August 1982.

(August-September 1982)
Led exposure of Reagan-
Thompson’s link
domestic costs and
divergence of public
money into politicians
coffers.

Chicago Rehah, Network,
a coalition of housing
development organizations,
was joined by other
community-based
organizations.

(August-September 1982)
Made administrative
complaints; presented
at Maye Byrne’s office
and launched media cam-
paign against rejected
funds to meet other
political objectives of
Byrne’s administration.

The Smearer victory was termed
a “people’s victory” and a defeat
for Byrne and the Regular Party.
Served to further weaken the
machine in the black community.

The victory was not the end.
Led directly into mass voter registration
push. The leader-
ship was challenged by key supporters
of Washington’s mayoral bid.

Led to mass voter registration
drive that was based upon
mobilizing and disenfranchising
among blacks, latinos and poor
whites.

Led to a general and widespread
anti-Byrne motion that had
developed in the neighbourhoods.
It served to undermine Byrne’s
time of repression. HUD mixed
funds had to be removed.
mbolic representation (1923-47) represents when two blacks were on the Council. Symbolically the representatives of all declining Black Power Batting Average black population while council membership Lambda representation (1947-67) represents but an incremental increase on me to six black members of the Council. e loyalists in the Daley machine. (c) tion (1967-83) characterized by an increase the council. Black council representatives me regulars and independents. Currently antly black wards in Chicago. Two of the persons who are machine loyalist, while

I-Up
the black community had to be mobilized structure of political opportunity (increased to be taken advantage of by effective social an be effective to the extent that sufficient cus the mobilized resources on one key political conditions of social protest — res and unified political focus — were by insurgent forces, especially the black the Task Force for black political empowerment aspects of this pre-campaign build-up: nensus of issues, especially the mayoral unifying political objective to defeat Jany sus of leadership, by agreeing to support idate — Harold Washington; and itical resources, voter registration, educa to accomplish the defeat of Byrne and the gion.

the major aspects of the overall social Chinese during the pre-campaign period. ¢ ‘bread and butter,’ standard of living and against discriminatory practices by the Byrne city government. The issues are: quality of services (numbers 1, 6 and 7) representation (numbers 2, 3 and 4), and economic distribution (number 5). Large sectors of the overall city population were affected by these issues and, therefore, had an interest in the success of the protests.

There was significant media support for protest action. In the black community, there was a major daily newspaper (Defender), a weekly press (Metro News and Chicago Observer), several black-oriented radio stations, and a Black Press Institute which provided general access to all black newspapers as a clipping service. This was supplemented by black journalists in the mainstream media (for example, Vernon Jarrett and Monroe Anderson at the Tribune) including at least one black show on every TV station. A critical role was played by a newspaper started by radical white militants operating ‘outside’ the political mainstream (All Chicago City News).

But the critical media dynamic was provided by Lu Palmer who coined the phrase ‘We Shall See in ’83.’ This became his slogan in 1981:

Well in ’81, we held a city-wide political conference. ‘Toward A Black Mayor’. You know it is really kind of revolutionary for black folks to start doing something in ’81 and looking toward a goal of ’83... So we said at Malcolm X College, first thing we are going to have to do is change the mind-set of our people. So we coined a slogan ‘We Shall See, in ’83.’ And we printed that slogan on every piece of literature that went out. I was on the air with Lu’s Notebook on four black radio stations sponsored by Illinois Bell, and I just laid on my family of listeners ‘We Shall See in ’83.’ I do a talk show at night, two nights a week, On Target. I signed off, ‘this is Lu Palmer reminding you that “We Shall See in ’83.” Slowly, agonizingly slowly, it began to catch on and people in the community began at least to think about the fact that we could see in ’83. And, over a period of time, brothers and sisters, we shall see in ’83 became an institutionalized rhythm in the hearts, minds and the souls of black people to the point that when Harold Washington finally announced, November 10, 1982, the first words out of his mouth were ‘We Shall See in ’83’ (Palmer 1984).

This media context that promotes Chicago movement protest is the weekly hour broadcasts on three radio stations from Operation PUSH. For over a decade the PUSH microphone has been open to virtually every progressive black political candidate and
as developed, the black community knew results and people were getting excited. Byrne administration became the central reform anti-machine movement. made as struggle proceeded from these issues into a political protest movement with "target." In symbolic and concrete terms, politics was imminent in Chicago was the r. As a monolithic structure, the political succession was apparently not prepared for subsequent events seemed to reflect the dated structure unable to adapt to new class reluctance to transfer power to new

is instance of black political protest unique unity about who black people were against, which unity about who black people were.

Table 11.3 presents the top ten names from surveys of the black community that could draw the most black support as a

an to meet regularly and black business regularly sounded out by political insiders material resources required to fight in the k mayor if a consensus candidate were elites saw the possibility of running id not have their full support. By 1982, this census of black elites was taken to the test of the early militant leaders working for Palmer was well aware that victory was at a high level of black unity could bedevil the polling of black public opinion as a as a way to organize people for the mayor. By his account, CBUC and friends 0 ballots and got back over 13,000. There over 54 names. The top names on the ballots were interested and a final list of 20 was to be presented to a mass community called a 'plebiscite.' About 1,500 people ting at Bethel AME Church and voted on Table 11.8 for results). The mass list is slightly different in that there are three

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ELITE*</th>
<th>ELITE**</th>
<th>MASS***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Roland Burris (1) (State Comptroller)</td>
<td>2. Harold Washington (1)</td>
<td>2. Lu Palmer (0) (Chair, CBUC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Richard Henehouse (1) (State Representative)</td>
<td>3. Roland Burris (1)</td>
<td>3. Danny Davis (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Wilson Frost (1) (Alderman)</td>
<td>4. Jesse Jackson (0)</td>
<td>4. Roland Burris (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cecil Partee (1) (City Treasurer)</td>
<td>5. Richard Henehouse (1)</td>
<td>5. Jesse Jackson (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Warren Bacon (1) (State Board of Human Education)</td>
<td>6. Wilson Frost (1)</td>
<td>6. Lenora Cartwright (1) (City Commissioner (Human Services))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Earl Neal (1) (CHI Board)</td>
<td>8. Clifford Kelly (1)</td>
<td>8. Anna Langford (El) (Lawyer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Jesse Jackson (0) (PUSH Executive)</td>
<td>10. Danny Davis (1) (Alderman)</td>
<td>10. Margaret Burroughs (El) (Director, DuSable Museum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Clark Burris (El) (Corporation Executive)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Survey by the Chicago Reporter Newsletter - 9 insiders (1), 2 elites (0), and 1 outsider (0)
** Survey by AIM Magazine (Summer 1982) - 5 insiders, 2 elites, and 1 outsider
*** Community Vote organized by CBUC (May 1982) - 6 insiders, 2 elites, 2 outsiders; also 3 women

Note:
The Chicago Reporter is a monthly civic newsletter with a race relations improvement focus; AIM Magazine is published monthly as a racial harmony and peace-oriented black publication.
"CBU" the Chicago Black United Committees is a leading activist organization headed by Lu Palmer.
"CHA" is the Chicago Housing Authority.
women. Further, most of the insiders are CBUC polling process more adequately character of the movement on campaign.

Washington's friends were the militants of were high achievers and fought inside Washington had been careful to maintain ties, receiving his apprenticeship training in Metcalfe ward organizations. So now being selected by this more recent generation, at least a chance by the black elite, by strong material encouragement. He had in 1977, and he had good name recogni- of 1982 a consensus had developed that the or mayor was Harold Washington.

was approached by the militant outside responded as a political insider would to his core. He made his candidacy contingent on being able to register 50,000 new black young them out in the autumn (state-wide) under increased his demand to 100,000 new

movement responded to his challenge. A suit open up the registration process and, for the tical process, it was opened up in employees and public housing projects. As it turned centres were located in places where local taking place and were being operated, in those who had been leading these protest struggled for people to connect the two aspects of their own narrow interest with a political mple throughout the city. This set the stage support from the black elites. Ed Gardner, dent of Soft-Sheen Cosmetics Company, $50,000 for an advertising campaign to registration drive 'Come Alive, October 5' the autumn of 1982 as the action slogan to be 'We Shall See in '83.' By 5 October, over 130,000 had been placed on the rolls. Over registrants were black.

late build-up of political resources (issues, a was to a great extent initiated and carried

out by black protest movement leadership.

The Task Force

As a militant coalition of organized forces, the Task Force was based on previous networks developed in the movement and forged in the community-based fights for reform during 1982. In October (1982), Joe Gardner (then a top executive in PUSH) called a meeting of about 100 people to discuss a black candidate for mayor. This gathering at Roberts Motel (largest black motel in town) decided that were such a campaign to develop, it would be necessary to have a militant organization that would be a parallel force to the official campaign. The emerging strategy required a free wheeling coalition operating outside the conventional limitations that define political insiders and institutional elites. Robert Starks was asked to develop a definite plan and, on that basis, the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment was formed.

The climate of unity was set, but its implementation in a context of militant political outsiders required movement skills, and not the bureaucratic logic of rule-governed behaviour. At the very beginning, insurgent styled insiders were dominant inside the Task Force. Danny Davis, one of the most independent of the black members of the City Council, acted as chairperson for the first few meetings, and was joined by virtually every new political aspirant. However, this was at odds with the more 'movement' oriented masses who began to attend the meetings in increasing numbers. The main struggle was over whether to focus on the election exclusively or to include other issues of struggle as well. A committee led by Bob Lucas developed a coalesced leadership slate and from that emerged the Starks/Worrill leadership.

The main thrust of the Task Force in the early period was to develop political resources. Washington's first goal was to get on the ballot, and this required 3,505 signed petitions. While he was reported to have got 100,000, the Task Force leadership announced that they had collected 20,000. Washington had just received 172,641 votes in his successful re-election to Congress, so he already had a mass base. But the issue of building resources was not only one of getting petitions signed, it was one requiring the mobilization of voters.

CBUC organized four voter clinics (on 3, 10, 23 and 30
Detroit moved to Chicago with his staff to be an on-site national adviser to the campaign, and to help unite the black elite leadership behind Washington.

Three Campaign Tactics

Locally, there were three major developments that opened up the political climate and set the stage for a rapidly expanding social movement.

1. During January (18th, 23rd, 26th and 30th), a series of four debates was organized and broadcast on radio and television. This gave Washington his greatest public exposure to date. And, for the black community, he was cast in the role of a gladiator. More than Byrne and Daley, Washington was an orator who combined the rhetorical flair of the black ministerial tradition with the polisyllabic acumen that a law degree brings. He 'turned the black community on.' He became viable within and outside the black community. His coffers began to swell as local and national money came pouring into his headquarters in the final weeks of the Primary.

2. One week after the last debate, Washington's campaign held the largest rally for any candidate, when over 15,000 people came out on a 'hard' winter day in Chicago. An earlier rally had not really worked (2,500 turned out when 10,000 were expected). This rally had to work if the momentum generated by the 'Debates' was going to continue. The people came from throughout the city. The committed base of the campaign was there for all to see. There was increased participation from the mainstream black elites and insiders, but they had to witness the emergence of a black social protest movement that they did not and probably could not control. This led to increased interest in Washington since he might be able to control them and, certainly, it increased the amount of attention paid to the Task Force because that is the precise reason for its being.

3. The development of the basic button led to mass identification with the campaign. POWER made a simple 'blue button' with a rising sun stating, 'Washington for Chicago.' This slogan was adopted by the time of the general election and over 1.25 million buttons were distributed. In sum, a positively charged climate had emerged which had as its main aspect greater candidate credibility (debates), greater visibility of mass and elite support (rally), and the movement had a public symbol of
tatement of solidarity (the button).
was stated in part by Nate Clay (1983), a
4, in his analysis of the major rally on 6
ur of a civil rights movement rally of the 1960s.
ustastic crowd that filled the cavernous Univer-
vil in at an 'All Chicago' rally for mayoral
Washington was deep testament to the fervour in
try around his candidacy.

mentators admitted that it was the biggest
r of the three major contenders has held. I have
ongressman Washington can become Mayor
thin the next two weeks, his operation evolves
to a movement. Black people are turned on by
mpaigns.

he Task Force
ere three instances in which the Task Force
in defending black unity: ministers, media, black minister, as the main institutional elite
ity has long been a broker of political influ-
ns had declared support for Byrne and Daley,
them to speak in their churches. The Task
motion by forming an alliance of 300
verend Al Sampon's lead and they took out
he Defender in order to identify the black
ston. As outsiders, the Task Force formed
 endorsement meetings of black ministers
me (for example, 19 January at the Hyde Park
isters met to endorse Daley). This created an
tion as some of these ministers felt so much
congregations that they had to pull back and
t bandwagon. One of the major 'race
verend J.H. Jackson, former head of the
vention. Yet, his importance had greatly
e had joined with Mayor Daley in his opposi-
ights Movement of the 1960s. He even
her King. It appeared that race loyalty in the
ement was greater than the traditional hold
had on their congregation in Chicago. It was
time to fight back against the 'white folks and win,' rather than follow the leader so characteristic of past practices of the black Church.

Another instance of the Task Force defending unity emerged when it was learned that the Defender newspaper was likely to
withhold its support from Washington. A committee of the Task
Force leadership met with the newspaper editors and threatened
a counter-attack, even a boycott. The Defender subsequently
changed its orientation and supported Washington.

Lastly, there was the gang problem. The Task Force was so
committed to its goals that it opened the doors to everyone in
the black community, even to street gangs such as the EJ Rukins
(formerly the Blackstone Rangers). However, it appears that
Byrne and 'Fast' Eddie Vrdolyak, out of their respective war
 chestes of $10 million and $1 million, appropriated money to buy
the gangs' support. They stopped coming to Task Force
meetings and began to harass campaign street workers, includ-
ing anybody wearing a blue button. Several Task Force leaders
led groups to confront the gangs. But it is interesting to note that
these confrontations were initiated by the community reformers
more than by the ACC leadership, since the former were used to
defending the rights of community people. The ACC leadership
found it possible to include the gangs in their definition of black
unity, which set up people in the Task Force for attack.

Resource Mobilization

The Task Force raised little money for the campaign itself.
However, it did manage to gather enough resources to sustain a
temporary office on 47th Street, to maintain a part-time office
manager and a bank of telephones. The phone lines were
handled by staff volunteers who called registered voters in the
19 black wards to recruit volunteers for the movement and to
encourage a high turnout for Harold Washington.

The Task Force did produce two mass leaflets ("Our Future is
in Your Hands" and "We Discovered It [Chicago], We Should
Govern It"). The Task Force developed its own button (red, black
and green, the symbolic colours of black nationalism) which was
distributed through networks primarily on the South Side. The
Task Force recruited several hundred people to distribute
leaflets door-to-door and at shopping centres during the last two
weekends of the Primary.
leadership reports that there were hundreds of sets passing out ‘one million pieces’ of pro-
literature during the weekend of the trough CBUC, and the Near South Side
Task Force played a key role in training, dred election day workers, many of whom
never anything other than vote in an election.

provisioned workers for Washington’s public transit stops and at public housing
section day the Task Force recruited a fleet of voters to the polls and to provide logistics,
functions.

A primary victory was a people’s victory. It

reached a peak with effects upon subse-
quence, particularly upon the Task Force. The
significant social protest is often followed
the level of effort and organizational discri-
bination within the Task Force came precisely at
other upswing or upsurge in activity was
election was seven weeks away. There
situation and momentum. This occurred simul-
campaign organization being forced to adjust
ions of success and to the need for an
move. The new political tasks of the
that political resources be redirected and
the black community. This was indicated
el of effort being expended in trying to reach
voters. Second, there was new emphasis on
development which contrasted sharply
thrust of the primary and the pre-campaign
ning Committee was expanded to include
whites and Latinos in formal and functional
l (2) there was the formation and announce-
bon’ transition team composed of mainly
professional elites.

ese readjustments in campaign orientation
lost of status of (and a role shift for) the
ere new needs for the general election. This
se it was no longer necessary to use militant
tactics to defend black unity. The pervasive racism generated by
Epton’s campaign, and the racist reaction of the machine’s
defeated leadership was sufficient to ensure unity in the black
community. Washington took on all the traits of a gladiator who
could do no wrong in the black community. When white
Chicago Democrats decided to vote Republican, Chicago was
put on war alert.

However, the Task Force leadership resisted preparing a
plan on how to stay out in the face of the spontaneous mass
energy unleashed by the Primary victory. Hence, the Task
Force’s role became focused on campaign literature distribution
and advance street work for Harold Washington. It raised no
new demands and no programme. An important distinction
between the role of the Task Force in the primary and the
general election periods is that it had lost its capacity to innovate
tactically. (Or, as Al Sampson, a leading member of the Task
Force stated, ‘We haven’t busted any new grapes since the
Primary.’)

Thus, the effect of the primary victory (and the transition in
strategy on the part of campaign leadership in the face of an
expanding movement) significantly altered the social character
of the leading bodies of the campaign organization. We saw
earlier that the composition of the insider organizations was
predominantly institutional elites. The Transition Team was
composed of professionals with technical and bureaucratic
skills, while the Steering Committee was expanded to include
more black ministers and Latino and white professionals.

The orientation and outward thrust of the campaign were
altered. Simultaneously, this development produced a role-shift
in the relative importance of the Task Force. The Task Force had
given the campaign a militant character that was no longer
required. The role redefinition of the Task Force was reflected in
its demise and fall in status relative to other bodies and activities
in the campaign organizations. Included in this was the
expanded use of television and radio advertising supplanting
the need for door-to-door street workers. The campaign’s
attempt to reach into the black community was only very
intense during the last two weeks leading up to the general
election.
We do not believe that the future will merely repeat this process in Chicago or any other city. However, what we can learn is that when a community is oppressed and exploited, an explosion of political protest is probably more normal than acquiescence and submission and, in the final analysis, the outcomes are influenced decisively by the qualities of leadership.