The New Technological Imperative in Africa: Class Struggle on the Edge of Third-Wave Revolution

Abdul Alkalimat

The twentieth century is ending as a global drama full of conflict and change, with humanity torn between hope and despair. For a few the new century offers the wonder of a high-tech future, with wealth amid the birth of a new civilization; but for the majority there is fear of war, starvation, homelessness, poverty and plagues that lead to certain death. Almost all Africans share the fate of the majority, with their countries falling rapidly into various levels of social disintegration. This article proposes a framework for understanding this tragedy in class terms, in the hope of reorienting our thinking from one of hopelessness to a vision of a new epoch of revolutionary class struggle. Specifically, I examine the development of a new class as a result of the technological revolution taking place in the advanced industrial world and its impacts on Africa. Such an analysis is essential to understanding the new poverty in Africa and the accompanying political revolt of the dispossessed (Peery 1993). These notes are organized around ten propositions that together constitute this framework for understanding the African crisis, the new class and this new stage of revolutionary struggle.

Background: Classes and Class Struggle

1. Africa has been a source of great wealth for the world, but has little to show for its enormous contributions, and today it is the poorest continent with the lowest quality of life. Africa hasn’t always been the poorest continent, but this has
been its fate since Europe has dominated it, via a colonial structure that forced Africa into poverty and has kept it there. Belgium is a good example of a country whose wealth was built on the rape of Africa, particularly the Congo (now Zaire), where the extraction of rubber and copper forged a lucrative colonial economy. Today the gross national product of Belgium equals that of the entire continent of Africa – but there are 10 million people in Belgium, while there are 720 million in Africa.

Africa has been devastated by at least three major historical relations of exploitation: slavery, colonialism and neocolonialism. The people, the societies and the natural environment have all been savagely plundered. However, the world doesn’t always remember the historical forces at work when examining the barbarism that is currently tearing Africa apart. What is most obvious is that the invading enemies of Africa have mainly been Europeans and their descendants, and therefore to the extent that they are at fault one hears an analysis of racism. On the other hand, when violence erupts within the African context, it often appears as Black-on-Black crime, and this brings forth the charge of ‘African barbarism’, implying that Africans are inherently uncivilized. However, neither white racism nor African barbarism provides an adequate analytical framework for understanding the African crisis.

The historical development of most African societies carries forward the social forms of life associated with rural subsistence agriculture and urban industrial development. Although there is very little of the latter, the cities are the main link with the former colonial powers and the global economy and are therefore the centers of power. The main point here is that this insider/outsider dialectic (Africa/Europe) is realized through the social institutions that reproduce material life, and therefore it is this social life, based on classes, that we have to analyze.

2. A major theoretical task is to analyze the African experience in terms of class, especially for each stage of history identifying the class dynamic of those Africans whose exploitation prods them toward revolutionary struggle. A debate over this issue has been at the center of revolutionary African discourse since the 1960s.

Frantz Fanon, author of *Wretched of the Earth* and activist in the Algerian liberation movement, was clear in his indictment of capitalism:

For centuries the capitalists have behaved in the underdeveloped world like nothing more than war criminals. Deportations, massacres, forced labor and slavery have been the main methods used by capitalism to increase its wealth, its gold or diamond reserves, and to establish its power. (Fanon 1963)

Fanon advanced a class analysis that identified the peasantry as the main revolutionary force, with the lumpenproletariat as its main ally in the cities.
Among the lumpenproletariat Fanon included a number of urban groups: pimps and prostitutes, the hooligans, the unemployed, petty criminals, maids and juvenile delinquents:

It is within this mass of humanity, this people of the shanty towns, at the core of the lumpen-proletariat that the rebellion will find its urban spearhead. For the lumpen-proletariat, that horde of starving men, uprooted from their tribe and from their clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people. (Fanon 1963)

Perhaps the most profound understanding of the dynamics of the African revolution was developed by Amilcar Cabral in his two seminal essays 'Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea' (1964) and 'The Weapon of Theory' (1966). Cabral's analysis of classes and their revolutionary capacity demonstrated the diversity of rural groups by comparing the Balante and the Fula. The Balante had a communal society based on village life and governed by a council of elders. The land was owned by the village and the tools owned by each family. Women worked in production and owned what they produced. The Fula, on the other hand, were formally organized around hierarchical power groups, first the chiefs, nobles and priests, then the artisans and traders, and finally the peasants on the bottom. Among the Fula the women worked as well, but did not own what they produced. As it turned out, the Fula were dominated by the Portuguese through their chiefs. The Balante resisted colonialism, and as Cabral put it, 'This is the group that we found most ready to accept the idea of national liberation' (Cabral 1969). In sum, Africa's rural peasantry was diverse, and therefore revolutionary strategy therefore required an analysis of their objective and subjective conditions.

Cabral makes a point of discussing the wage earners of Guinea, indicating that they were not a fully formed industrial working class, since there was little or no industry and limited urbanization. However, Cabral notes that the dock workers and ship workers were aware of their position in African society vis-à-vis the Portuguese and were very militant, undertaking strikes without any formal trade union leadership and thus serving as a nucleus for revolutionary activity among urban workers (Cabral 1969).

Cabral makes a major theoretical clarification with regard to the lumpenproletariat. He uses the term 'de-classed' to refer to two different groups of people, both dislodged from their previous class relations (and context for social reproduction of these relations), and not yet socially fixed in a new set of class relations. The first group is the degenerated broken group, the beggars and prostitutes, the social parasites. The second group is an incipient proletarian class. Cabral writes that this second group is 'mainly young people recently arrived from the rural areas with contacts in both the urban and the rural areas ... it is among this group that we found
many of the cadres [activist members, the revolutionary party] whom we have since trained' (Cabral 1969). Class categories thus need to be clarified: unemployed youth in the cities should not be lumped together with degenerate elements. It is clear that Fanon anticipates Cabral here but lacks Cabral's conceptual clarity.

Cabral makes his most important contribution in his essay 'The Weapon of Theory.' He argues against a theory of history that requires class struggle, because this would liquidate the validity of much of the traditional African experience. More inclusive is a conception of stages of history before, during and after classes. He makes this incisive point: 'It seems correct to conclude that the level of productive forces, the essential determining element in the content and form of class struggle, is the true and permanent motive force of history' (Cabral 1969).

On this basis, the final stage of history (after the antagonism of classes and class struggle) is contingent upon a qualitative leap in the development of these productive forces:

> In the third stage, once a certain level of productive forces is reached, the elimination of private appropriation of the means of production is made possible, and is carried out, together with the elimination of the phenomenon 'class,' and hence of class struggle; new and hitherto unknown forces in the historical process of the socio-economic whole are then unleashed. (Cabral 1969)

Cabral has thus sketched out the basic thesis underlying the argument of this paper, that technological revolution is pushing forward a new class in history, one way (directly) in the advanced countries and another way (indirectly) in the developing countries, especially Africa.

One necessary clarification is that Cabral calls this development the end of class, and here I refer to it as the appearance of a new class. In a fundamental sense it is this new class that has the historical position of standing outside capitalist class relations, and the political necessity of destroying capitalism as the logical trajectory of its fight to survive. The new class has no way of stabilizing its economic life, neither in the sale of its labor power nor as a ward of the capitalist bourgeois welfare state: none of these options is open to it. The new class is forced to fight for the distribution of wealth on the basis of need. This wealth exists based on the increased productivity of the new technological innovations combined with their diminishing demand for human labor. The greatest enemy of the new class is also its greatest friend. This contradiction will be resolved only as this class comes into being, becomes conscious, and fights to victory.

While it might be argued that this is a contradiction in terms, the best name for this new class might be the communist class. Both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are classes of the capitalist system of commodity production and exchange, and their class struggle is therefore inherently refor-
mist because they both must exist within the same system. The new class is revolutionary because it has no option but to fight for a new system. It is in fact born only with the appearance of new productive forces and thus represents the new system in embryo.

Basic Concepts of Class Analysis

3. Every society can be summed up in terms of the contradictions that shape its social life. The main features of class society are the classes, whose social relations are grounded in the economy and around which political life revolves. The development of classes in the last century of Africa’s history has been shaped by three main historical contradictions that can be summed up by their corresponding theoretical concepts: mode of production, proletarianization and class struggle.

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<td>Key Concept</td>
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The mode of production itself is a contradiction: ‘By the mode of production is meant the totality of productive forces and production relations at a historically specific stage of development of human society’ (Popov n.d.). On this basis, it is clear that several modes of production coexist in African societies, together making up Africa’s socio-economic formations. This process began with the contradiction between the traditional forms of African agricultural and the emergence of merchant capital (Blaut 1993). Today the main aspect of this process is the domination of Africa by the leading economic forces within the global economy (Cooper 1993).

The concept of proletarianization is fundamental to the impact of the global economy, from colonialism to the present. Traditional forms of economic life involved ownership of land and the corresponding instruments of production. Colonialism began the process of separating Africans from their means of survival and isolating them as a source of labor. The proletarianization of labor has meant forcing Africans to sell their labor power as
a commodity in a capitalist labor market, in urban industries, mining, and in large-scale commercial (export-oriented) farming.

This proletarianization can best be understood as having three forms. Wage-earners are simply the largest category of people who sell their labor power for a wage. The growth of this category is a measure of the expansion of capitalism. A special subgroup of this category is the industrial working class, known for its relationship to the factory system, including its advanced tools, productive capacity and concentration of workers. Third is the basic proletariat, workers marginalized both from the subsistence agricultural sector and the wage-earner sector. This last group stands outside any system of economic survival. It should not be confused with the lumpenproletariat, which was excluded from joining either the working class or capitalist class during the origins of industrial capitalism. The basic proletariat is a new class, and is excluded from employment by the technological advances that are ending the industrial capitalist system.

Africa has the world’s fastest rate of urbanization, with its urban population currently at 39 percent overall. By the year 2000, there will be eighty-nine cities in Africa with a population over 500,000. This urbanization has not slowed the fight for survival but has rather increased it. Only 47 percent of Africans have access to modern health services, 40 percent to safe water, and 32 percent to sanitation; and the African daily calorie intake is only 91 (less than a candy bar). The alienation of Africans from the land and their related proletarianization was part of an accumulation process by which resources and wealth were gathered in the urban areas and then shipped abroad to the colonial centers of accumulation in the global economy. This in turn produced wealth in Europe and North America but poverty in Africa. This poverty falls into historical stages: the poverty of traditional Africa, the poverty of colonialism and the poverty of the global economy.

The poverty of the global system was introduced as imperialism, driven by finance capital in the interest of industrial development in the advanced countries. Africa was made more dependent, and African poverty was linked to the advance of Europe:

The towns and cities were abstracted from their environment and were more organically and closely related to the metropolitan countries than to their own hinterland...The position of the urban work force itself was unstable with its fortunes dependent on the oscillation in the demand for raw materials in the world markets... The growth of the extractive industries did not lead to the development of an internal market or to an articulated commercial sector. The use of the migrant labor system for mining and cash crops led to the most advanced deaconisation and proletarianization, but without corresponding industrialization to meet the future need for jobs when mineral production became exhausted or unprofitable. (Mariotti and Magubane 1979)
The global economy is so interconnected that no previous mode of production in the world can maintain its independence; all are subordinated to a more advanced system. Today the high-tech revolution is leading the way, dominating all forms of finance and industrial capital. Proletarianization no longer means being separated from one’s land and tools and placed in a job as a wage worker. Now proletarianization means being separated from all forms of secure employment and stable work (including the option of returning to the land to resume subsistence farming). The emerging class struggle is being driven by new international forces that are forcing people down toward absolute poverty.

The World Bank reports that of the forty poorest countries in the world, thirty are in Africa. In many ways Africa is the only continent going backwards, whereas on other continents it is only the new class that is going backwards, or specific regions that are being economically marginalized. Per capita income in Africa has fallen below the level for 1970. In 1980, 80 percent of children of primary school age were enrolled in school, but by 1990 this had fallen to 69 percent. It is estimated that by the year 2000 African children will account for 39 percent of the annual deaths among the world’s children. Ghana makes an interesting comparison: in 1960 its per capita income was higher than that of South Korea, but now South Korea’s per capita income is six times that of Ghana. In 1960 India faced famine while Ghana was rich in food, and now the situation is reversed (Amis 1990). In 1985, based on a measure of $370 annual income, 47 percent of African adults lived in poverty. Global capital no longer needs African labor, though there remains some demand for African agricultural and mineral wealth. Africa accounts for only 2 percent of world trade.

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<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Political/Economic Determinants of the New Class in Africa</th>
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<td>Agency of Political Policy</td>
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Origin of the New Class in Africa

4. What is new about this poverty? Why do these poor constitute a new class? This poverty is new because it has new causes and a new permanence.
traceable back to the high-tech revolution at the center of accumulation in the
global economy, and therefore in global terms it is part of the same class being
created in the streets of the major industrial countries. This poverty exists with-
out the hope of an industrial capitalist cure. It is the product of political and
technological/economic forces.

Table 2 identifies the four main political economic determinants of the
new class. The most important factors are the external political interna-
tional institutions who determine the policies that African countries must
follow, and the least important is the direct application of the new technol-
ogy. The main thing is that all of these factors are tied together and must be
understood as interrelated parts of one historical process.

5. The global debt crisis emerged in the 1980s, and the debt of the sub-Sahar-
an African countries increased rapidly, from $2 billion in 1970 to $56 billion
in 1980 and $174 billion in 1990 (Naziqer 1993). These debts are based on
loans of many kinds from many different sources, but all the debtor coun-
tries must conform to the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) 'condi-
tionalities' stipulated by the International Monetary Fund. Loans by interna-
tional financial institutions (World Bank, IMF and so on) were policy initiatives
that guaranteed greater and greater African dependency on the advanced countries.
The advanced world would thus continue its advance, while Africa would go back-
ward.

Aid to Africa has not encouraged industrial development: "Foreign Aid
to manufacturing industry, which constituted less than 12 percent of total
official aid to Sub-Saharan Africa at the start of the 1980s, fell to no more
than 7 percent by 1989, and this trend appears set to continue" (Riddle
1993). In any case, where foreign capital has invested in manufacturing it
has been 'import-dependent, capital-intensive projects' wrapped in a myr-
iad of conditions. One study reported the deal offered to Kenya in 1969 by
Firestone. Firestone demanded, in return for an investment in a tire plant,
monopoly of the tire market with a ban on all other foreign imports, duty-
free imports of machinery and materials, the right to use its own formula to
set prices, and control over technical manpower (Stein 1992).

One of the main tools of economic control has been currency devalua-
tion. For example, in 1994 the fourteen African economies tied to the
French franc devalued by 30 percent. As one academic said, 'One day, I had
enough money to buy [a fax machine] ... the next day I had the same
amount of money - but it bought only half a fax. Our poverty has been
multiplied by two.' Over the last decade the per capita income in the franc
zone has fallen 40 percent (Kamm 1995). Another tool has been the reor-
ganization of agriculture to grow cash crops for the international market.
Agricultural commodities account for up to 62 percent of nonfuel exports,
which are usually exported in raw form without any industrial processing.
Such a large amount of Africa's arable land is used in such commercial
farming that up to 25 percent of the food consumed in Africa is now imported (Adedeji 1991; Dadzie 1991).

6. The high-tech revolution driving the advanced economies constitutes the material basis of the policies being implemented by the international financial institutions. There are several ways in which the high-tech revolution affects Africa. The main impact has been to render Africa redundant in one economic sector after another, from agriculture to mining, industry and skilled personnel.

The high-tech revolution is searching for or creating new materials that are cheaper and more productive. An example is the conversion of telephone lines from copper wire to fiber-optic cable. This change will be devastating to the Zambian economy, because copper accounts for over 95 percent of its exports, and to Zaire, where copper accounts for over 50 percent of exports. For sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, copper exports during 1965–73 expanded by 2.9 percent annually but declined by 0.9 percent during 1973–84 (Adedeji 1991).

Africa remains dependent on exporting agricultural products because its industrial sector has remained stagnant, accounting for only 9 percent of employment in 1989 and 10.9 percent of its GDP and 15 percent of exports (in 1990). Most countries are mono-crop economies, and this makes them vulnerable to price fluctuations on the world market. But even more devastating is the potential for the biotech industry to engineer substitute products. One recent report makes this clear: ‘Global consumers soon will have a choice, according to a Bank report, between Kenya AA coffee, which is justly famous, and biocoffee beans made in laboratories in the United States. Laboratory-produced vanilla has threatened the livelihood of 70,000 vanilla-bean farmers in Madagascar (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994).’

One of the most far-reaching features of the high-tech revolution has been the intensifying brain drain of scientific and technical personnel. SAP conditionalities have forced African governments to cut spending on higher education, and Africa’s university and research-level institutions have been rapidly declining. Students go abroad to finish their degrees and never return, and faculty who can have been doing the same.

7. The use of technological innovations to expand African productivity has been limited because most technology is not absorbed and reproduced as part of the local economy.

Beginning in 1964 during the UN’s first development decade, and repeated since then. African governments have called for a rising percentage of the GNP to be invested in research and development. The goal is an increase from 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent, but it has never been reached, and there continues to be a shortage of adequate skilled personnel. Throughout Africa the use of expatriates is a major issue because they command high salaries, don’t serve as parents and teachers to nurture go a replace-
ment generation, and maintain a Euro-American frame of reference. The IMF and World Bank often insist upon the use of these foreign experts, while the legacy of colonialism leaves Africa without its own experts, a situation common throughout the so-called developing world: 'The developing countries with some 70 percent of the world's population account for only 30 percent of the world's higher education, 5 percent of expenditures on research and development, and 1 percent of ownership of patents. It is thus in the field of science and technology that one of the most extreme manifestations of underdevelopment is exhibited' (Onimode 1982). This problem takes its most extreme form in Africa, with a population explosion but limited scientific/technical resources. Africa has about 720 million people and will likely increase at least twofold to 1.6 billion by 2025. On the other hand, Africa has only 53 scientists and engineers per million of population, while the corresponding figure is 3,548 for Japan, 2,685 for the USA, 1,632 for Europe, and 209 for Latin America (Kennedy 1993).

The central concept then is technology transfer. This means the following: 'International technology transfer may occur through a variety of processes, including licenses and patents, supply of machines and equipment, exchanges between scientific bodies of various countries, purchase of technical publications, consulting and engineering services by foreigners, on site training of indigenous personnel by foreign experts, and students studying abroad' (Urevbu 1991).

In general, the transfer of technology hasn't worked in Africa, and when it has the projects have been relatively low tech. The Green Revolution, which uses advanced technology to increase food production, has worked in Latin America and Asia, but the same techniques and plants have not worked in Africa. However, the necessary investment in research to adapt Green Revolution techniques to African conditions has not been made, so this is not a limit of the technology per se but reflects a lack of commitment to find the appropriate technology for Africa. The same problems appear in industrial production, especially with capital-intensive approaches that ignore local conditions. A Tanzanian shoe factory provides a good example. An Italian consultant set up the public-sector Morogoro Shoe Company, choosing a capital-intensive approach common in Europe and ignoring conditions in local industry. The company's factory never reached 5 percent of its capacity, and even failed to meet the quality demands of the local market. 'Most of the machines were never opened, and deteriorated on the shop floor; the foreign exchange cost still has to be repaid by Tanzania to the World Bank' (Lall 1992).

There are some profitable high-tech developments in Africa, but as in the case of Ghana's gold mines the benefits to most people are small. The workers at these mines don't see any gold until it is poured into bars, as the refining is all done by smart equipment that teases out the gold from as little as half a gram per ton of rock:
'It used to be that when any mining site opened up, people would come from far and wide to look for work,' said John Quarko, a retired manganese miner who now washes cars in the lot of Tarkwa's (the mining town) one motel. 'It seems these new companies that are coming in are only interested in hiring watchmen and computer people.' (French 1995a)

The new technology of the information revolution is just getting started. The first and only meeting of government ministers dealing with information technology was organized by UNESCO in 1980, but other initiatives have been more productive. Africa lags behind in this area as in others. While Africa has 13 percent of the world's population, it has much less than this share of information tools: 1.8 percent of book publishing, 1.5 percent of newspapers, 4.0 percent of radio receivers, 2.3 percent of TV receivers, and 1.4 percent of telephones (of which 50 percent is in South Africa).

There is stiff international competition in telecommunications and things are about to change very rapidly. William Gates, CEO of Microsoft, has announced a plan to set up low-flying satellites by 2010 so that cellular phones would be practical anywhere in the world. On the other hand, AT&T has announced a plan to be completed in 1997 to lay fiber-optic cable around the entire continent of Africa, with up to forty points of entry, to provide modern phone service to every African city and village. In fact, AT&T sponsored a recent cultural festival in Ghana, PANAFEST, and began its penetration of the Ghanaian market. The company set up calling centers in three cities in which phones connected festival visitors to the US and to more than eighty other countries. These centers have become permanent international phone exchanges accessible through local phones by dialing four numbers.

Furthermore, the use of the Internet is spreading quickly. This is the vehicle that will transform technology transfer and link Africa to the new technology revolution. One of the emerging centers, the African Regional Center for Computing, is run by a senior lecturer in computer science at Kenyatta University in Kenya. They have set up ARCCNET, a network based in Nairobi with two gateways to the Internet (Lubbock 1995). Most of the Internet activity in Africa is thus far in South Africa, which is easily accessible via the Internet.

One national project worth noting is Egypt's plan to launch its own communications satellite capable of handling twenty-four TV channels as well as radio signals. In addition, Egypt has set up the Pyramids Technology Valley Project with the aim of developing high-tech industries, including microelectronics and biotechnology (Abiodun 1994). However, such an advance must be coordinated with a general plan for the country, and for the region, or it will fall under the influence of the other high-tech sectors of the world economy.
8. African governments have been the pawns of international financial institutions
as degenerate social forms of accumulation and power, assisting the rich countries
to continue their plunder and overseeing the new impoverization of the African
peoples. The level of degeneration is obvious in some countries, which
barely have any government at all. A recent account of Zaire clearly illus-
trates this level of degeneration. Zaire's economy has shrunk 40 percent
since 1988, and per capita income has fallen 65 percent since 1958, two years
before independence from Belgium.

'Zaire doesn't really exist anymore as a state entity,' is how one European diplo-
mat here put it. He cited the separate arrangements that each of the eight
provinces has made to assure its survival: 'Kivu lives from informal trade with
East Africa, East Kasai refuses to accept the national currency. Shaba has be-
a virtual extension of South Africa and to visit Equateur even though it is the
President's home, is to see things just as they were in the time of Stanley.' (French
1995B)

President Mobutu has been propped up by the IMF, the World Bank and the
US and European governments and is a billionaire reported to be one of the
richest men in the world. Zaire is as big as the US east of the Mississippi
river, with a population of 35 million. If one considered it to have a govern-
ment it would have to be regarded as a police state. The majority of African
governments suffer from some combination of military rule, criminality
and tribalism.

Together the four determinants of the new class summarized in Table 2
demonstrate that the impact of the advanced countries, especially through
the international financial institutions, have pushed Africa backward. The
people being forced into poverty are not likely to return to precapitalist
subsistence peasant origins, though they may be forced back to a meager
life is rural areas, and they are unlikely to be absorbed in an expansion of
the industrial/commercial sector in the cities, though they might well fit
into the informal sector and 'hustle' to survive.

9. This new class is being formed in forbidden zones, areas within cities, rural
provinces, refugee settlement camps. In some instances the new class is being formed
out of entire countries that have become economically unstable, consumed with
violence and crime, and that concentrate a negative quality of life. One analyst put
it this way:

There is another type of society in Africa, which I call the non-economies, like
Niger, the Central African Republic, Chad etc. etc. These are states that have no
viable resource base at all ... [In this situation] I am worried because I see rather
the foundations of genocide; we have arrived at a new era in Africa in which we
begin to solve the problems by eliminating the men. (Frank 1981)
Death stalks the new class in Africa. Fratricidal wars take many lives (for example, Liberia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Natal Province in South Africa), viruses turn villages into death camps (HIV in Uganda, ebola virus in Zaire and Sudan, and so on), infant mortality is the highest in the world, and much more. Sixty-five percent of HIV-positive cases in the world are in Africa. It is clear that mortality rates are tied to socio-economic conditions. Forbidden zones are created where the people are forced toward absolute poverty and are faced with the danger of genocide.

The world often views these problems divorced from the class forces that bring them about and prevent them from being resolved. In the case of civil wars, none of the combatant forces could survive long without external support, and it is this support that comes from global capital with the condition of continuing the client relationship after a new government has taken power. For example, France and Belgium continue their mischief in Rwanda and Burundi, with the compliance of another client state, Zaire. It is one rotten mess by which African politics continue to be manipulated in European and North American capitals.

It is not too extreme to speak of genocidal conditions when discussing the forbidden zones of Africa. This is not mainly due to the evils of white racism, nor to the barbaric nature of Africans, though white racism is ever-present and all fratricidal wars are barbaric. We have to re-examine the framework for the emergence of the new class, because it is precisely the structural origins of the new class that help explain the basis for this genocide. In other words: why now? The labor of the new class is no longer needed by global capital. Africa has the world's fastest rate of population increase, so from the point of view of global capital something must be done (or not done, if we are considering solutions). It was even suggested in one popular book on the ebola virus crisis that this was a 'normal' thinning out of the human species!

The clue to linking these human disasters to the emergence of the new class is that there is a remarkable similarity to the African experience in the forbidden zones of the USA, especially the inner cities and the Indian reservations. Life is cheap when it represents labor no longer needed by an economic system. When society abandons a community, or when a society is abandoned, and in both instances abandoned after generations of dependence without any significant transition, then the only expectation can be a disaster. It is the height of hypocrisy for global capital to wash its hands of the conditions it is responsible for creating.

Within Africa the new class has no allies in ruling government and corporate sectors because its existence is so desperate that it challenges the security of all privileged groups.

Governments and fascist movements in the advanced industrial countries have manipulated immigration laws to keep the starving masses of the world from 'invading.' One Japanese analyst put in this way:
We cannot rule out the possibility that a day will arrive when literally hundreds of thousands of people from developing countries will begin to form hordes and force themselves on the advanced nations. It would not be at all surprising if this occurred before the end of the century. The possibility exists of great racial migrations in the near future. (Sakaiya 1991)

The current wave of racism and fascist violence is fueled by this fear of migration from the new class of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

10. The path to the twenty-first-century African revolution will be set on behalf of a new class whose survival is contingent on breaking the control of international financial institutions, detinking from the exploitation of the global economy, and developing production for the consumption and well-being of all its members and all of society. This will require disposing of the degenerate African state in its military or corporate form and creating a mixed economy in which the new technologies, especially the research and development needed for an African green revolution, are unleashed on a planned and coordinated basis along with a labor-intensive mass mobilization of people into agricultural development, infrastructure development (roads, bridges, dams, ports and public sanitation systems), and education.

The emergence of the new class is just beginning, and therefore the degeneration of social life will worsen. The historical period will find not just Africa, but the forbidden zones within the advanced industrial countries being isolated more and more, being denied the economic basis to survive, denied access to the democratic process to fight for justice, and denied the legal social institutions (such as schools and labor unions) to build unity and mobilize for struggle. New forms of social life will have to emerge to ensure economic survival and organize political resistance.

However, the new technology that is currently the material basis for this deepening crisis also provides the possibility of a solution. The new technology is small and increasingly inexpensive, especially in terms of telecommunications utilizing phones and computers. Just as the Internet placed the revolutionary peasants of Chiapas on the world stage, these tools will be used by revolutionary forces in Africa as well. But here the technology must be regarded as only a tool of struggle. The Zapatista Army was first organized and politically united around a revolutionary program of action in order for it to have the chance to use the new technology effectively. The solution to the rise of the new class will come from the political mobilization of the new class, enhanced by full utilization of the new technology.
References


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