BLACK POLITICAL PROTEST AND THE MAYORAL VICTORY OF HAROLD WASHINGTON:
CHICAGO POLITICS, 1983

Abdul Alkalimat
Doug Gills

AFRO-AMERICAN STUDIES AND RESEARCH PROGRAM
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
1204 West Oregon Street
Urbana, Illinois 61801
USA
INTRODUCTION

The Harold Washington mayoral election was an historical event of great significance. The success of Chicago's mass movements in the electoral arena is a source of renewal and of inspiration. The point of this paper is to outline the main historical background that shaped the mayoral election in Chicago in 1983. It is with this level of understanding that we can more accurately draw out the present and future implications of the Chicago experience, both for national and local urban politics in general, as well as Black liberation protest politics in particular.
The development of Chicago mayoral administrations has been summed up by Donald Bradley:

The type of men recruited for the mayoralty changed over the 125 years of Chicago's history. The office was initially (1837-1869) the prerogative of the early promoters and original business elite of the community. Alteration in the economic structure of the city, the proliferation of public services and official responsibilities, the qualitative and quantitative changes in the population, however, all created a new trend in political recruitment. The rapid change experienced by the city in all of its aspects produced an atmosphere conducive to the cult of the personality that obtained between 1880 and 1930. The 1930s saw the stabilization of the community and the ascendency of a dominant party machine. Thus, between 1931 and the present, the chief elected office in the city has been held by a group of political entrepreneurs who came up through the ranks of the party organization.

When viewed in the broad perspective of the changes that have taken place in Chicago, two factors stand out as responsible for the observed trend in political leadership: the desirability of political office for those differentially situated in the community fabric, and the type and distribution of political resources within the community. Related to, but analytically distinct from, the ambition to hold political office is the ability to muster the necessary support.

BLACK POLITICS: AN OUTLINE

Black politics fits this mold to some extent. Early Black politicians from 1870 to the 1920s were strong individualists who attached themselves to a political faction when it served their ends, and frequently changed sides as political expediency dictated. They were "race men" in that their overriding concern, as individuals, was to work for the good of Black people, or community.

A second stage in Black politics emerges when the "Black machine" is built. James Q. Wilson identifies its origins:
### TABLE 1
HISTORICAL STAGES OF CHICAGO MAYORAL LEADERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Chicago Mayors</th>
<th>Avg. Years in Office</th>
<th>No. of Mayors</th>
<th>% Mayors Democrats</th>
<th>% Mayors Chicago-Born</th>
<th>% of Years in Office, by Occupation: Lawyer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Elite</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86.8 (N=38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1837-1875)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factions</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>57.1 (N=56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>(1876-1930)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Administrators</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>51.9 (N=52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1931-1983)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2
HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHICAGO POPULATION:
NATIONALITY, RACE AND CLASS, 1690-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>NATIONALITY</th>
<th>RACE</th>
<th># of Workers in Manufacturing (000's)</th>
<th>CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Foreign Born</td>
<td>% Foreign Stock</td>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>% Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>14.5²</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Foreign stock includes people foreign-born and children of foreign born, so in 1890 41.0 percent were born outside of the U.S. and 36.8 percent were their children.

² This increase in percent of foreign born reflects the new immigrants from imperialist contradictions in Central America, West Indies, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.
The Negro machine owes its existence in part to the existence of a city-wide Democratic machine; it is, to use a clumsy phrase, a "submachine" within the larger city machine. Although Negroes have held important political office in Chicago since 1915 (when Oscar de Priest was elected alderman) in Cook County since 1871 (although continuously only since 1938), and in the Illinois State Legislature since 1876, the rise of the present Negro machine did not begin until 1939. In that year, Dawson, an independent Republican who had served in the City Council, switched parties and, with the active support of Mayor Edward Kelly, entered the Democratic Party as committeeman of the second ward. Real political power in Chicago is vested in the ward committeemen. Although nominally they are elected by the voters of each ward, in fact, they are selected by the party leadership. All political matters, including the control of patronage, are decided by the ward committeemen, either individually or collectively on matters concerning the party as a whole. Negro political strength is coterminous with the number of Negro ward committeemen, and the existence of a single Negro machine is dependent on the extent to which these Negro ward committeemen can be led as a group by one of their number.4

Beginning in the 1960s with massive civil rights demonstrations, a third stage of Black politics began to emerge -- independent politics. Rooted in radical movements, including activists who would later rise to prominence (e.g., Harold Washington, Gus Savage, Bennett Johnson, etc.). With this phenomenon Blacks began a movement often discussed as "Protest at the Polls," the first organized thrust for Black political power. At times they supported regular Democrats, but by the time of the militant anti-Daley demonstrations in the 1960s, a stream of independents began banging on the door of City Hall. Despite these actions, they gained little substantial benefit for the masses.

The 1960s, a decade characterized by sustained mass protest, struggle and involvement, won some benefits for middle-class Blacks. But in Chicago, the middle class lost interest in local voting because they had not derived sufficient material gain from it. In contrast to the South, for example, Black middle class participation remained low except in presidential elections.

Further, the machine did not work for a large voter turnout, so the masses of Blacks were not encouraged to vote. An independent politics had been developing since the 1960s, but it had yet to become sufficiently organized to mobilize and consolidate the mass vote. The mid-60s in Chicago witnessed an explosion of mass political participation and various forms of social action. Malcolm had said that change would come from the "Ballot or the Bullet." During the 1960s Black riots, Daley gave orders to shoot to kill, and at the same time, he used the Democratic machine to maintain order and political control. (1983 is a case of mass participation that was directed into the electoral arena).

Richard J. Daley's tenure in office is important in several respects. First, he presided over the structural transformation of Chicago from an industrial city into a monopoly metropolis where the leading role in the economy was played by corporate banking, insurance and investment capital organizations. Second, Daley was able to hold together a tenuous political coalition composed of diverse elements including increasing numbers of Blacks who could not be readily absorbed into the patronage exchange system. Local contradictions which were apparent within the old Democratic coalition were held in abeyance by the influx of urban renewal dollars into the central city and under control of "The Mayor." 5

DALEY AND THE MACHINE 6

Chicago was run by Richard Daley from 1955 to 1976, ultimately the undisputed dominant figure in City Hall and in the Democratic Party. He was point-man for the Irish, and administered their disproportionate control of power and jobs despite their declining numbers and percentage of the population.
In 1955 when Daley was first elected, the Irish were 10 percent of the population, but held one-third of the City Council positions. Irish mayors have been in office from 1933 to 1983, except for 1976-1979 (when Daley’s floor manager in the City Council, a Croatian, was installed after Daley’s sudden death). This has been a source of grievance to the Polish, the largest white ethnic group in Chicago, but never with their own mayor.

Daley was unopposed for four of his six elections. He was a formidable opponent who could scream four-letter words on national television, order police to shoot and kill looters during riots, and force prominent civil rights leaders to give him the “Black-power” handshake. In fact, when he did these things, working-class white ethnics loved him even more.

Mike Royko, a well-known Chicago journalist, quotes Ben Adamowski about Daley’s early career while they were young state legislators in Springfield, Illinois:

I remember those walks. Abe Marovitz was always saying, “Some day the three of us will run Chicago, a Pole, an Irishman, and a Jew.” Abe was always saying that. But Daley never said anything. I never once heard him say a word about where he wanted to go. Actually, he didn’t say much of anything. He rarely said anything on the Senate floor. He was very quiet, humble, and respectful of everyone, and he developed a reputation for being good on revenue matters, but that was about all.

Most of the time he kept to himself, stayed in his motel room, and worked hard. In Springfield, you could tell real fast which men were there for girls, gams, and graft. He wasn’t. I’ll tell you how he made it. He made it through sheer luck and by attaching himself to one guy after another and then stepping over them. His ward committeeman in those days was Babe Connelly. Babe was always pushing Daley out front. He sent him to Springfield, pushed him for the better jobs. Then, when Daley got a chance, he squeezed Connelly out.

Things began to change in 1975 when Daley was challenged in the primary by an independent (Singer), a reform-oriented Black (Newhouse), and an out-of-favor machine hack (Hanrahan, the infamous butcher who ordered the murder of Fred Hampton of the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense in 1969). Then Daley died on December 20, 1976. As in all political regimes run by a strong leader, the question of succession is a critical issue, and it is here that the seemingly invincible machine revealed its internal tensions, and fundamental weaknesses.

A critical issue is the way interest groups were co-opted and held together by the Machine. This combined an exchange of material rewards for delivering the vote based on precinct organizations within the wards. Jobs and economic factors were differentially and disproportionately allocated based upon voting strength which, in turn, was based on which ethnic groups you represented. Irish votes counted more than Blacks’ and Blacks were given jobs on the lower levels, in the less well-paying agencies. The Black middle-class was given honorific positions of status with little control of jobs because they could not be trusted to hire “right” — meaning, hire mainly loyal Democrats and Blacks who would work for the organization.

POST DALEY FRACTIONALISM

The position of president pro-tem of the Chicago City Council had been held by three Blacks (Ralph Metcalfe, Claude Holman, and Wilson Frost) up to Daley’s death. When Daley died, Frost believed that conventional constitutional precedent would elevate him to the position of acting mayor. Armed Chicago police met him at the mayor’s office and rudely turned him away. Power was seized by using the armed force of the state, and Blacks on the
City Council were forced to swallow pride of self and community in exchange for Frost becoming chair of the Council’s finance committee. Michael Bilandic, a Croatian who was Daley’s Council leader, became the fourth consecutive mayor from the predominantly Irish 11th ward.

The special election in 1977 attracted some challengers. Bilandic, a machine pick, beat Pucinski (running for the Polish), Harold Washington (replacing Newhouse as the Black reform candidate), and Edward Hanrahan (the machine renegade). This was the last race to be controlled by the old machine regulars. Blacks were now less reliable, and no charismatic white candidate who could rally the old coalition was in sight.

Bilandic was not an exciting mayor. He presided over factional fights and simply tried to hold things together. Powerful forces were given key posts: Edward Vrydolyak was made president pro-tem, Edward Burke became chair of police, fire and education, and Ed Kelly maintained parks with its large patronage.

An academic insider, Milton Rakove, in his book Don’t Make No Waves, Don’t Back No Losers, sums up the end of the Bilandic administration:

In the winter of 1978, one year into Bilandic’s mayoralty, there was, however, a minor upheaval of some consequence. Jane Byrne, who was Commissioner of Consumer Sales, Weights and Measures, a small city department, accused Bilandic in the media of "greasing" the city’s taxicab companies with regard to a projected fare increase. After a short brouhaha in the press between Byrne and Bilandic, the mayor fired the Commissioner.

Byrne, aggrieved by her sudden dismissal, convinced that the new regime headed by Bilandic constituted "an evil cabal" that had corrupted the political organization and city government built by her mentor, Richard J. Daley, and bent on revenge for the wrongs done to her and Daley, announced that she would run for mayor against Bilandic in the February 1979 primary.

Byrne had some assets as a candidate. She had a sharp intellect, good "gut" political instincts, a long-time familiarity with the political workings of city hall and the ward organization, an ability to communicate effectively at street level with the voters, and a talent she had acquired as Commissioner of Consumer Sales. But neither Bilandic nor the machine took her candidacy seriously.

Under normal circumstances, Bilandic and the machine would not have suffered from their political mistake. But the winter of 1978-79 was not normal. The worst snowstorm in the city’s history paralyzed the city and aroused the citizenry. The city government’s inability to clear the snow away, the breakdown of public transportation and garbage collection, the anti-city hall posture of some key media figures, and Bilandic’s handling of the public all combined to encourage a massive anti-machine turnout on primary day. Byrne received all of the normal anti-machine vote in the city plus an outpouring of normally lethargic non-voters who trooped to the polls to register their anger and vent their frustration on the machine’s candidate, Mayor Bilandic. Byrne won the primary by 16,000 votes. Six weeks later, with the assistance of the machine she had defeated in the primary, she also won the mayoralty with 52 percent of the vote, a higher percentage than even Daley had received in any of his six mayoral victories.

Byrne ran against the machine, won, and then the machine took power after the election. The "evil cabal" became her closest advisors, and the people she feared most were those who had elected her. Further, her protest vote had also elected new young Black Democrats to the City Council -- Danny Davis, Niles Sherman, Timothy Evans, and Marian Humphreys -- all with independent postures. She had to deliver, or be challenged as she had done to Bilandic.

Byrne blew it. She gave virtually every aspect of the movement fuel for building a protest movement against the machine. Further, and more decisively, she did this when Black and progressive forces were conscious that they created her with votes and could eliminate her the same way.
THE BYRNE INTERREGNUM AND MASS PROTEST

In the period from 1967 to 1979, Black representation in the City Council leaped to virtual proportional representation. From 1918 to 1947, there were only two Blacks in City Council. By 1967, their numbers had increased to six. In 1971, fourteen Blacks were elected to Council, and fifteen in 1975. By Byrne's inauguration there were 16 Blacks in City Council. Byrne's Administration becomes important in several respects. First, a significant number of Black aldermen within the Council began to vote consistently against the machine on issues viewed as vital to the Black Community. Second, and related to the first, Black aldermen came under mounting pressure from a Black electorate which had demonstrated a growing tendency to withdraw support from machine-backed candidates in primary elections. This forced Black aldermen to take more independent stances particularly around representational issues (i.e., Black appointments to public housing, public school and police review boards, etc.). Finally, and in conjunction, local activists involved in a series of welfare and substantive issues targeted Jane Byrne's Administration and the mayor's office as the focus of attack to address the deteriorating conditions Black faced in housing, health care, employment, distribution of welfare benefits, educational opportunity and enforcement of affirmative action standards for Blacks, women, Latinos, etc.

Thus, a most important dimension of the pre-campaign build-up to the fall, 1982 massive voters registration drive was the significant linkages of organizations and community activists involved in diverse issues of struggle around essentially "economic" issues into city-wide networks which aimed their protest demands at City Hall. The political expression of this anti-Byrne movement was translated into the massive voters registration drive of the fall of 1982 where over 160,000 new voters were added to the rolls.

THE SELECTION PROCESS: FROM "NO MORE JANE BYRNE" TO "WE WANT HAROLD!"

The Mayor (Byrne) and the leading white challenger, young State's Attorney Richard M. Daley, son of the late Mayor Daley had their followings. Both had major shares of the fragmented machine organization. Both had major public offices out of which to mount an offensive that could propel them to victory. But the people had no champion to challenge either of the Democratic Party regulars. Beginning in 1980, a movement to find a Black mayor began again.

A "Committee For a Black Mayor" had been formed in 1974 and attempted to draft Ralph Metcalfe, the late 1st Congressional District Congressman. It was led by Harold Washington and Charles Hayes (now Congressman). In 1975, State Representative Richard Newhouse ran a symbolic campaign when Metcalfe refused to break with Mayor Daley. In 1977, Harold Washington tested the waters garnering 77,000 votes. Now, anticipating the 1983 election, a consensus building process had emerged. Community leaders were polled for their opinions. A Chicago Defender newspaper poll was taken; and a community-wide questionnaire project drew responses from 13,000 people. All these surveys provided an indication of the developing popular consensus to support the one person who had both the public credentials, the leadership traits and political orientation—Harold Washington. By the summer of 1981, led by some activists from across the city, a concerted movement began to "draft" Washington.

THE PEOPLES' CHOICE

Harold Washington had been a Democratic Party regular, the son of a precinct captain whose position he assumed. But he bolted the party machine
TABLE 3
SELECTION OF A BLACK MAYORAL CANDIDATE:
THREE CITYWIDE SURVEYS, 1983-1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Roland Burris (State Comptroller)</td>
<td>2. Harold Washington (I)</td>
<td>2. Lu Palmer (O) (Chair, CHIC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Richard M. Hodge (State Representative)</td>
<td>3. Roland Burris (I)</td>
<td>3. Danny Davis (I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cecil Partee (Alderman)</td>
<td>5. Richard M. Hodge (CIA Board)</td>
<td>5. Jesse Jackson (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Carl Hal (CIA Board)</td>
<td>8. Clifford Kelley (I)</td>
<td>8. Anna Langford (E) (Lawyer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Jesse Jackson (D) (PUSH Executive)</td>
<td>10. Danny Davis (I) (Alderman)</td>
<td>10. Margaret Burroughs (E) (Director, DuSable Movement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Clark Burrell (E) (Corporation Executive)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Insiders, 2 elites, 1 outsider
**Insiders, 1 elite, 2 outsiders
***Insiders, 2 elites, 2 outsiders; also 2 women

NOTE: The Chicago Reporter is a monthly civil newsletter with a race relations improvement focus; AIM Magazine is published monthly as a racial harmony and peace-oriented black publication.

The Chicago Black United Communities is a leading activist organization headed by Lu Palmer.

CIA is the Chicago Housing Authority.

In 1975 and became an independent. He had achieved national visibility as the popularly elected replacement for McCalfe (after the machine appointee, Bennett Stewart, served out a term), and he was elected national vice-president of the liberal Americans for Democratic Action. Other candidates were less appealing because they were: (1) still party regulars, (2) not well-known throughout the city, or (3) had never held public office. Washington had demonstrated his viability as a candidate by winning every election in which he ran except his 1977 bid for Mayor, and then he did better than all previous Black Mayoral candidates in Chicago.

Washington called for the necessary condition of any serious citywide race -- massive Black voter registration. He asked that 50,000 new voters be added to the rolls. This was a serious historical problem facing any "challenger" who represented essentially excluded constituencies.

The Chicago Urban League had issued a report on his problem in September 1981: Why Chicago Blacks Do Not Register and Vote. It began with a focus on the 1983 mayoral election:

If Black political participation could be increased five percent to ten percent, Blacks might effectively determine the outcome of this crucial election. Within a year after this election, control of the City Council and most services of city government also may well be at stake.

Analyzing whether the 5 to 10 percent increase was possible, the report offered eight reasons why Blacks don't register and vote, and heading the list were "not interested in any of the candidates" (49.4 percent); and "fed up with the whole political system" (32.2 percent).

Lack of electoral participation appears to be a long-term, deeply-rooted 'structural' problem -- one for which electoral reform and other superficial stop gap
measures can only have very limited and temporary success... Sizeable, sustainable increases in Black registration and voting are unlikely without a rather fundamental effort to make politics and public affairs a much larger part of Black family and community life.

THE CAMPAIGN BUILD-UP: VOTER REGISTRATION

There were several key aspects of the massive and extensive voter registration movement that culminated the pre-campaign build-up and set the stage for the Democratic mayoral primary. While many of the traditional institutionalized organizations (i.e., NAACP, Chicago Urban League, PUSH) had attempted to build for a mass Black community registration as early as the previous year, the really significant aspect of the pre-primary voter registration drive was marked by the entrance of grassroots community efforts both within and outside of the Black Community. While several community based groups contributed to the effort (e.g., Chicago Black United Communities, Vote Community, Peoples Movement for Voter Registration, PUSH, etc.), the most unique contribution was made by P.O.W.E.R., a city-wide coalition of welfare recipients and unemployed workers under the leadership of heads of community based organizations among Blacks, Whites and Latinos. It was POWER's approach to concentrate on nontraditional sites for registering the previously alienated as "new voters" (e.g., welfare recipients, youth, hard-core unemployed, etc.).

The Black leadership in most of these groups became the principal actors in the formation of the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment, which emerged as the informal arm of Harold Washington's campaign organization. Added to these efforts was the significant infusion of money from Black businessmen to the voter registration drive. Most notable was a cosmetic industry millionaire, Ed Gardner (Soft Sheen), who was the principal financier of a "Come Alive" media blitz. While these united community efforts represented one of the indispensable pre-conditions for mobilizing the Black community for a Black mayoral success, the uniqueness of this voter registration movement was its city-wide character.

By September 1982, the earlier goal of 50,000 new registered voters had been reached with the tactic of mobile registrations — taking registration stations to welfare and unemployment offices within the city's South, West and North Sides. Washington's response was to increase the call to register 100,000 new voters! The leadership of this movement answered him. With combined efforts of POWER, PUSH, Vote Community, People's Movement, CBUC, and Citizens for Self-Determination, an all-out campaign was launched to meet this challenge. Churches were targeted, public aid offices, library centers were established, and an extensive absentee ballot thrust was coordinated by PUSH and CBUC. Gardner announced that he would put up $50,000 to sponsor a media blitz targeting the Black community for the weekend of October 5. Over that weekend alone, some 60,000 registrations were made, principally in the Black community and mainly independent of the regular party apparatus. During the registration period, some 160,000 new registrations were recorded. Black registration increased by 120,000 potential voters.

This massive voter registration had been fueled by a series of representational and substantive issues which saw essentially "economic" and "status" goals along sectoral lines—translated into political demands which identified Jane Byrne's Administration with that of Governor Thompson and President Reagan's anti-social, anti-labor and racist policies which buttressed the dominant economic interests in the country.
Table 4

POLITICAL HOBILIZATION OF RACIAL-NATIONALITY GROUPS:
REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT AS PERCENTAGE OF VOTING AGE POPULATION.
1979 - 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary 1979</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General 1982</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary 1983</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General 1983</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By January 1983, the combined total of Black registrations was 610,000 out of an estimated 750,000 eligible Black voters. (The total primary registrations were 1,582,000.) These potential voters had to be protected from challenges by the machine-controlled Board of Election Commissioners. This was done successfully mainly through strong community monitoring and vigilance.11

When community representatives approached Washington with 160,000 new registrants, his response was, "Yes, they are registered but (1) will they turnout, and (2) will they support the independent candidates in the November 2 state election?" These were no trivial questions given that in the 1977 primary, only 27.5 percent of all eligible Blacks voted when Washington ran against Bilandic and Pucinski. In 1979, (Bilandic vs. Byrne), only 34 percent of all registered Blacks cast ballots out of some 490,000 Black registered voters.12

In Chicago, the November 1982 election was characterized by an anti-Republican vote. The Black community leadership was lukewarm about the Stevenson candidacy. But the Black turnout against Thompson was overwhelming. (This factor overshadowed the fact that the three independents targeted for support for State Assembly seats (Monica Faith Stewart, Art Turner, and Juan Soliz) lost because of the machine's "Punch 10" campaign for a straight Democratic ticket vote. This tactic cut into the votes of all independents.) This mobilization demonstrated to the Black leadership and to Washington supporters in particular, that the Black community would unite to support a viable Black candidate for Mayor.13

THE CANDIDATES

The Washington strategy had been predicated on at least two strong white Democratic party candidates vying for the primary nomination. The
TABLE 5
CANDIDATES FOR DEMOCRATIC
MAYORAL PRIMARY: FEBRUARY, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Harold Washington</th>
<th>Jane Byrne</th>
<th>Richard Daley</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birthplace</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of Birth</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality</td>
<td>Afro-American</td>
<td>Irish-American</td>
<td>Irish-American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's Occupation</td>
<td>Minister/Lawyer</td>
<td>Corporate Executive</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Roosevelt Univ., Northwestern</td>
<td>Barat College, U. of Illinois</td>
<td>Providence College (R.I.), DePaul Univ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>Housewife-Civil Affairs</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Experience</td>
<td>Father was a precinct captain, served as apprentice to the Dawson Organization, held elected office for 18 years in State Legislature and U.S. Congress</td>
<td>Campaign volunteer, close associate of Mayor Daley, appointed positions in party and city government, only elected office as Mayor of Chicago (1979-1983)</td>
<td>Son of Mayor Daley (1955-1976), Committeeman of 11th Ward, held elected office for 10 years as State Senator and States Attorney of Cook County</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

theory was that Byrne and Daley would split the white vote and neither could afford to attack Washington for fear of alienating the Black vote.

The three prime candidates who entered the field were going to war in running for the mayoral seat. Before the 170-day campaign was over, dated from Daley's announcement on November 4, 1982 through April 12, 1983, for Chicago politics it would be the most expensive (some $15 millions were spent), the most corrupt (Byrne's blatant payoffs to street gangs), the most polarized along race/nationality lines (Byrne and Epton share the Taurels), and the most publicized (internationally, nationally and locally) mayoral race in Chicago history. (See Table 5 for a profile).

More people participated in the Primary and General elections than in any other election in Chicago history, and more white people voted on the losing side than in any two successive elections in the city's history. Going into the 1983 Democratic primary, the Chicago Black electorate had three choices. As it turned out, Byrne represented the present, Daley the past. Washington was identified with their aspirations for the future.

THE INCUMBENT

Byrne's 1979 campaign strength was among middle class and working women, the neighborhoods, and seniors. But she was not able to hold her electoral coalition together for very long after her election for several reasons. First, she was saddled by a deepening fiscal crisis that affected her relation with city employees (teachers, police, fire, lower-level department administrators). In order to keep spending in line to satisfy creditors as well as to protect her base among white homeowners, Byrne was forced to hold down salaries and block further increases in social expenditures given the City's declining tax base.
Second, in order to govern, she had to accommodate the machine leadership which demanded a free hand with patronage and the opportunity to make incredible deals that, once exposed, revealed the depth of political corruption. This caused a further loss of credibility, especially among the liberal opinion-makers in the media. Byrne apparently was willing to accept this accommodation so long as she was able to swell her "war chest." Byrne raised some $10 million for political campaigning by the primary opening. A large proportion of this money came from city workers (a source of resentment) and from agents with city contracts. She had already used $400,000 in an unsuccessful attempt to defeat Allen Streeter, a Byrne appointee in the 17th Ward who bolted the party organization and opposed Byrne on several key issues focused on her dilution of Black representation on city-wide policy boards.

Third, she reorganized the Office of Neighborhoods as a legitimate device to promote her image and to secure re-election as opposed to it being a policy. Moreover, she alienated community leaders by reducing and then rectifying the flow of money out of development programs at the neighborhood level and into "downtown" projects.

Fourth, while leaving her doors open to real estate developers and business contractors, Byrne lost credibility with many among the corporate elite who viewed her as politically unstable, prone to quick changes of both policy and personnel. Thus, she contributed to an unfavorable business situation by failing to provide a climate for continuity of program, personnel and policy-making in government leadership.

Fifth, while consolidating her alliances with the most reactionary and irresponsible wing of the Democratic party, she alienated herself from the mainstream of the party. On one hand, not having strong connections with the corporate and declining industrial elite, she was forced to build up her coffers by repeatedly "tapping" city patronage workers in addition to contractors doing business with the city. On the other hand, Byrne encouraged further fragmentation of the Cook County Democratic party and instead of uniting the party, she undermined her most organized potential base of support. She did this in the following ways:

a) dropping President Carter after earlier endorsing him in order to support Kennedy during the 1980 presidential campaign;

b) opposing Daley as State's Attorney in favor of Ed Burke in the 1980 primary and Bernard Carey, a Republican during the general election.

c) closely identifying with Reagan and becoming the only mayor of a large city not to oppose his domestic and urban policies; and

d) opposing former party Chairman George Dunne and supporting Bernard Carey, the Republican candidate for Cook County Board President.

Finally, Byrne made a series of tactical blunders that undermined her brittle support among Blacks and Latinos.

1. She attempted to play off Blacks against Latinos on the one hand while exploiting the nationality differences among the various groups within the Latino population in the city. She did this mainly through her appointive powers (i.e., replacing Kenneth Smith, a Black minister who chaired the School Board, with a Cuban, Raul Visiobos).

2. She made a series of white appointments replacing Black and Latino representation on other boards, commissions, and within departments.

3. She played the role of a "sacrificing public official," learning firsthand what the people faced. Byrne is from the 42nd ward that encompases what Chicagoans call the "Gold Coast and the Slums." She lived in the Gold Coast, it is contrasted by the Cabrini-Green housing development (known for the TV show "Good Times") is in the Slum. Byrne, amid tremendous publicity, "moved-in" to Cabrini. While she was there with her personal protection, crime was reduced. But she soon left, and it was worse than ever. Elevators would go out for weeks in which
5. Daly was expected to pick up substantial support among the Black community, which had been alienated by the actions of the Democratic party. He had to make a relentless attack on Byrne's campaign and his potential to win the Democratic party's nomination. Daly had to make a decision to either withdraw from the race or to challenge Byrne without attacking the Democratic party. He was not able to dislodge Byrne from the Democratic party, nor was he able to gain more than an even split with Byrne among Black voters.

In general, Dan Byrne initiated policies and actions which served to dilute Black representation and divert the flow of public resources away from the Black community. At a time when broad sectors of working people and age-dependent groups were experiencing a sharp downward turn in the quality of life and living standards, Byrne refused to step up to the challenge of protecting the interests of Black workers and poor people. His political stance reflected his commitment to the interests of his wealthy constituents, and his failure to support a variety of community organizations and social services.

When Richard Daley left the State Senate in 1960 to run for Cook County State's Attorney, it became clear to all that he was gearing-up for a mayoral bid -- perhaps as early as 1963 -- by testing his drawing power in a city-wide campaign announcement. His campaign announcement came as no surprise. However, it brought panic to Byrne's camp and hopes to Daley's supporters. Daly had a number of contacts, which he used to his advantage. Most of them were well-known names in the Democratic party, and they included the support of Daley's son and his political machine.

1. He had his father's name and his mother's backing. Richard Daley was judged to be the Democratic party's candidate.

2. He appeared to be gaining Byrne's support within the party to make winning against Byrne a realistic prospect.

3. Political allies throughout the city were behind Mr. Daley.

4. A significant political base within the Black community among the old generation of anti-Social workers and Byrne's followers would also help Daley win.
If on the surface, most of Daley's reform positions were shared with Washington, it only points to the fact that they both are liberal Democrats. They differed on the issue of patronage. Washington moved from a soft position on patronage reform to a hard position in opposition to it, while Daley was locked into a white ethnic base primarily among white trade union workers and city employees on the Southwest Side and part of the North Side of the city.

Daley had taken strong administrative initiatives on issues relating to women, and in promotion of women to positions of responsibility. This enabled him to gain endorsements of leading liberal feminists such as Dawn Clark Netsch, a State Representative who emerged as his campaign manager. However, he did not gain much support among women's organizations.

During the period they were both in the Illinois General Assembly, Daley's record tracked side by side with Washington's vote on most issues, i.e., the fight against the consumer sales tax, the fight for mental health and nursing home reforms, ERA, prenatal health care, expense of day care centers, equal pay for equal work, medical and mental care for rape victims, and child abuse-child support legislation. His strong stand against street violence (vs. "organized" crime) had earned him the enmity of the Black and Latino street gangs. Some eventually became paid, active supporters of Byrne. After failing to get money from the Washington campaign, the El Rukns cut a deal with the machine leadership which netted as much as $70,000 for "polling" assistance. The outcome of the primary election indicated a rejection of both the gangs and Richard J. Daley by the Black electorate.

HAROLD WASHINGTON

Harold Washington was born into the regular Democratic party. His father, Roy, one of the first precinct captains of the old Dawson organization, was a Baptist minister/lawyer. Washington attended public schools, graduating from DuSable High in 1940. He spent four years at Roosevelt University and was elected president of the student body his senior year.

After earning his law degree at Northwestern in 1952, Washington worked with the Illinois Industrial Commission (1960-64) and was Assistant State's Attorney in Chicago from 1954 to 1958. Washington never held local elective office but was elected to the Illinois Assembly in 1964.

In the Assembly (from 1965 to 1976 as a member of the House and as State Senator from 1976-1980) Washington drafted liberal legislation in the areas of consumer credit, witness protection, small business and minority set-asides, fair employment practices, the Human Rights Act of 1975, as well as being the prime sponsor of the Illinois Martin Luther King, Jr. Holiday Act of 1973. From 1965 to 1975 he voted generally with the Cook County Democratic Caucus in the Assembly, receiving his "idiot card" as did other machine minions" from Chicago. After 1976, however, he consistently voted his conscience and that of his constituency. This often put him into opposition to the Cook County machine.

Washington earned consistently high ratings by the liberal Independent Voters of Illinois-Independent Precinct Organization, as well as being rated one of the ten best legislators by Chicaco Magazine. Until his bid for the 1983 Democratic primary nomination, he was consistently endorsed by the Sun Times and Tribune as well as the Black-owned Defender.
In Congress for less than two terms, he distinguished himself as an active and generally progressive member of the Congressional Black Caucus and on the floor of the House as a sponsor/co-sponsor of progressive legislative initiatives. He led the successful fights for the Voting Rights Act extension, and against the Reagan proposed MX missile program. Moreover, he voted consistently against the Reagan budget cuts and for extension of welfare benefits. He introduced legislation in support of a nationwide emergency jobs bill during the winter of 1982. Finally, he worked with the Congressional Black Caucus to propose budgetary alternatives to Reagan's fiscal plans. On international issues, he opposed pro-South African initiatives in the House, supported the Nuclear Freeze, and consistently opposed U.S. foreign intervention in Central America while supporting cuts in defense spending by the United States government.

So in Harold Washington, Black people had drafted a standard bearer with the credentials and the orientation to be "their" candidate for mayor. Political insiders and representatives from elite positions were forced to unite with Community leaders from all sectors of Black Chicago in order to keep step with this new electoral upsurge or be cast aside. At the heart of the movement were the relative unity and tensions between these leadership elements (some inside the system, others outside the formal structures) who galvanized the resources needed for a victory at the polls in 1983.

THE PRIMARY CAMPAIGN AND ITS ELECTORAL OUTCOME

Following the build up to the massive voter registration, the Harold Washington Campaign unfolded through several stages, of which three are important here: a) the campaign crisis, b) viability, and 3) mobilization. The campaign organization and outreach got off the ground slowly, picked up steam and momentum in the second stage (during January) and built to a crescendo during the final (stage) three weeks leading into the February 22nd election. During the crisis period, the campaign was headquartered in the South Side neighborhood where it had emerged. Along with the initial efforts to consolidate a formal leadership structure, the campaign developed an informal organization: The Task Force for Black Political Empowerment. Founded by Black grassroots leaders, the "Task Force" was the key instrument through which the democratic input of movement activists was funneled into the formal campaign structure. The principal task of the "Task Force" was to expand and sustain the enthusiasm of the Black electorate as the basic force of the Washington candidacy, recruit hundreds, perhaps thousands of volunteers, who had spontaneously been thrown into the motion targeting City Hall and city government for reform. They were charged by the aspiration to have "one of their own" in the "Mayor's office." For the masses, Washington's victory would stand as a symbolic statement. For the middle class, the incentive was seen as an opportunity to expand the flow of resources under their control given the accelerated level of federal social expenditure retrenchments. The Task Force had to defend the high level of Black unity that had been built and provide "muscle" for the vulnerable Black candidate.

By December, Washington announced a 17 member Steering Committee comprised of prominent Black professionals, business and ministers and a few Black and White grassroots community and labor leaders. He recruited a permanent campaign manager who would be acceptable to a broader constituency within and outside the Black community and retained a media and public relations staff. The main task of this body was to mobilize resources such as money, expertise and to provide credibility building forums in which the candidate could build his coalition beyond the South Side Black base.
In January, three major developments paved the way for the Washington candidacy to increase its viability and consolidate its electoral base and broaden the campaign’s support. First, the campaign moved its headquarters downtown while opening up a dozen field offices that blanketed the main Black and integrated wards in the city. In addition to these formal campaign offices, Chicago Black United Communities (CBUC), the Charles A. Hayes Community Center, Operation PUSH Headquarters and the Task Force offices—all on the South Side—were informal peoples’ movement headquarters that were accessible to the grassroots electorate. The Task Force played a significant role in militantly confronting the Black church leadership and resisted their attempts to provide a forum to Daley and Byrne to reach the Black electorate. The pickets of certain Black churches was one of the most important tactical innovations in the defense of Black unity. Second, perhaps the major tactical innovation was the introduction of the famous “Blue Button.” With its simplistic design and message “Washington for Mayor of Chicago,” over 1 million buttons were produced and distributed and it was an important symbolic instrument of political cohesion, uniting the diverse pro-Washington forces across the city into a conscious movement in defiance of the Machine and regular party apparatus. Third, was the “Debates.”

After a long period of negotiations between Byrne, Daley and Washington camps, the four (late January) debates, sponsored by the media and civic elite groups in Chicago, played a decisive role in projecting Harold Washington as a “qualified” and viable candidate. It was on the basis of his sterling performance in the Debates that Harold Washington was able to galvanize the support of the national Black political elite who, in turn, pressured the local Black business and church community to break with the regular Democrats and to come out openly and actively to support Washington’s bid for Black power. Washington was also able to broaden his support among whites and Latinos. Many whites and Latinos had never seen or heard him. Now they saw and heard him for the first time. The debate surrounding his candidacy shifted from whether or not he was qualified to whether or not he should be supported.

The media split its support among the three candidates, as did the business interests in the City. Labor rank and file split between Daley and Washington, while the labor leadership stomped for Jane Byrne, the incumbent. Women organizations’ leadership went for Jane Byrne. While Byrne’s inability to deliver substantial benefits to working class and minority women contributed to their defection into the Daley and Washington camps.

The most important event in the late primary mobilization was the mass pro-Washington Rally staged two weeks before the election. Held on the near Westside, it was the largest rally of the election, drawing more than 15,000 people. Seventy-five percent were Black with sizeable representation of whites and Latinos. It mirrored his electoral support in the Primary voting. The event brought together both the Black political and professional and business elite, institutional and community-based leadership along with workers. It provided the drive that launched the energetic but untested Washington organization into an election day victory in spite of the stepped-up political intimidation and violence that characterized this stage of the primary.
THE OUTCOME

The Washington campaign had opened with "Harold" promising to take his campaign into every community, every ward and to every sector of the Black community. In response to this intensive-extensive and open campaign process, the vast majority of Black voters overlooked the mistakes, errors, blunders and high level of disorganization that were features of the Primary. The Black community made it a heinous crime to be unregistered, a shame not to wear a "blue button," and its leadership heaped scorn on all those who sided with the opposition. "No more plantation politics!" was the cry of Black activists.

Working people held hands with the unemployed and the impoverished across racial lines. The church support was reminiscent of the energy of the 1960s. The 60s were a period when the politically "dead" rose up. And there were many Lazarus-like wins and street people in the campaign who put on ties, picked up notebooks, pens and pencils, not merely to vote, but to advocate that others do likewise. In Black Chicago, Washington was at the helm of a crusade; although the campaign leadership vainly fought against projecting this imagery, it was the reality.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Washington</th>
<th>Byrne</th>
<th>Daley</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Vote Pct.</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Vote Count</td>
<td>(424,107)</td>
<td>(387,384)</td>
<td>(344,484)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wards Carried Pct.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote from Black Wards</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote from Latino Wards</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote from Lakefront Wards</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(middle class, white liberals)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote from White Wards</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Total White Vote</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Total Black Vote</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Board of Election Commissioners, Cook County, Illinois, February 1983.
The church had been an important support base that the campaign reached out to for resources. Women's groups united under the Women's Network in Support of Harold Washington. Here middle-class highbrows joined hands with welfare recipients. Youth joined in, to be led and to lead senior citizens who themselves had passed on the baton of active struggle to those now younger. The elderly, many of whom had been trapped in their high rises for years in fear, walked defiantly (of the gangs) to "punch 9" and await the unfolding of their wildest dreams -- a Black mayor in their lifetimes.

By far the most significant factor in Washington's victory was the registration, turnout and block voting of the Black community. This can be examined by looking at patterns in eighteen wards--eleven (2, 3, 6, 8, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24, 28, 34) with more than 90 percent Black population and seven (13, 23, 26, 38, 41, 45, 50) with more than 90 percent white population. In the eleven Black wards, voter registration increased by 78,919 between the 1979 and the 1983 mayoral primary. In the seven white wards, there was an increase of only 600 voters, with two wards showing a decrease in voters. Thus, the registration drive in Chicago's Black community, which added almost 150,000 new voters to the rolls, was a key tactic. (See Table 6).

Harold Washington received 36.3 percent of the 1.3 million votes. Jane Byrne 33.4 percent and Richard Daley 30 percent. Washington took 80 percent of the Black vote; Byrne won 14 percent and Daley 6 percent. Byrne and Daley split 88 percent of the white vote, while Washington received 10 percent. The Latino vote went mainly for Daley, 52 percent, while Washington received 24 percent -- a percentage that would dramatically shift in the general election. Eighty-four percent of Washington's support came from Black voters, 10 percent from whites and 6 percent from Latinos.

In the same eleven Black wards, the average turnout was 73.7 percent, as compared to 79.1 percent in the seven white wards. Though the turnout among whites was larger, there was a big increase in the number of Black voters between 1979 and 1983. The voter turnout in the eleven Black wards was 52.2 in 1979, increasing by 21.5 percent in 1983; in the seven white wards the increase was only 13.9 percent, up from 65.2 percent in 1979. The 1983 election was defined by the new Black voter.

Registration and turnout were much lower in previous years. Between 1959 and 1971, when Richard Daley ran four times unopposed, voting averaged 415,900 city-wide, though the city's population averaged 3.45 million -- almost 500,000 more than it was during the recent primary. For those same four elections, the turnout averaged only 31.4 percent of the registered voters.

The overwhelming support for Washington among Blacks is most significant. In the above eleven wards with high concentration of Black voters--ranging from 91.8 percent to 99 percent Black -- Harold Washington won 77.7 percent of the 276,678 Democratic votes cast. By contrast, in the seven white wards, Washington won only 0.94 percent of the Democratic votes cast -- 2,131 of 227,327 votes.

THE GENERAL ELECTION

Because of Chicago's contemporary significance as an international city of finance, commerce, communication and travel, because it is a city that has the second largest concentration of Blacks and its growing "Third World" population and the national implications that Washington's primary victory had for a pre-presidential election year alignments, the Chicago general election drew greater international and national coverage of any mayoral election in
U.S. history. In the aftermath of what was a people's victory (and a victory for the national Democratic Party) a whole series of swift realignments occurred at the national and local level of politics among Black and White political elites and insiders.

NATIONAL PARTY AND REALIGNMENT

The national Democratic Party, sensing an upsurge in electoral participation among Blacks and working people throughout the country, saw in the Washington victory the first step in Reagan's defeat in 1984 -- a rebuilding or reconstitution of the Democratic coalition. Therefore, recognizing the importance of Black voter strength, Democratic party leaders, candidates and officeholders put Chicago on their calendars and made it known that they would support Washington in "any way he desired." This comment was echoed by Allan Cranston, Mondale, Glenn, the early presidential frontrunners. The venerable Claude Pepper (D-Florida), a leader of the senior citizens lobby in Congress, was brought in to target the white ethnic vote among the aged. Bert Lance of the Georgia State Democratic Party endorsed Harold Washington amidst a great deal of publicity and led a delegation of Southern state party chairs to Chicago. Democratic fundraisers were held by Black and white party insiders across the country, notably in New York, Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles. There would be some degree of reciprocity involved.

THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS AND THE SOUTHERN STRATEGY

The Congressional Black Caucus represents the formalized political center of the Black elite in the U.S. Since 1980, Washington had been one of its newest but most vocal and progressive members in Congress. But it was only during the later stages of the primary, beginning with the "debates," that the Black Caucus began to view the Washington bid for mayor as a serious one. It was at this time that Caucus members, Conyers, Dellums, Chisholm, Harold Ford, etc., leaned on the national Democratic party to support Washington if the Democrats were to have any hope of winning in 1984. They were particularly incensed with, but not surprised by, Kennedy's endorsement of Byrne in the primary. However, they reserved their sharpest criticism for presidential hopeful Walter Mondale who endorsed Richard Daley -- in a miscalculated underassessment of the level of local Black unity operative in the Washington campaign and an overassessment of Daley's support in the regular Democratic Party.

John Conyers (D-Michigan) spent nearly three weeks in Chicago and brought in his leading organizers to head up the Election Day apparatus for Washington during both the primary and the general election. Other members of the Caucus raised money for his candidacy. While over 95 percent of his $1.3 million in primary funds were raised locally, over 25 percent of the $3 million, raised for Washington during the general election period was from national sources with Black Caucus individuals serving as conduits for a large percentage of these monies. This is, in part, substantiation for the observation that the Washington campaign had been "nationalized" and taken on as an agenda item of the national Black political elite.*

The success of the Washington campaign has led to a significant stimulation of interest in local elections across the country. Clearly, the

*Given the policy of reciprocity, since his election, Washington has spent considerable time on the road campaigning for local Black electoral bids across the country as part of the "payoff" to the NBPE, first and foremost, and to the Democratic Party in its electoral push for 1984 presidential election.
international, and certainly, the national media attention generated by the Chicago mayoral election has had a major, perhaps enduring impact upon the level of Black political participation and the nature of local electoral coalitions. This certainly was the case in Philadelphia where Wilson Goode withstood the challenge of Frank Rizzo, the arch-villain of Philadelphia Black movement of the late 60s and 70s. It has also had a positive contributive effect upon local elections in Boston and Baltimore where strong Black electoral challenges were being waged. It is too early to foretell what the full ramifications of the Washington campaign success will be on the unfolding alignment of race, nationality and class forces. A part of it will have to do with the outcome of the benchmarks and limitations of Washington's reform government administration in its practice, as well as the practice of progressive and radicalized sectors of the Chicago movement scene.

In Chicago, Washington had won the Primary without the support of the regular Democratic party organization. It appeared that he would have to win the General election without broad party support. Should he lose, the Democratic Party would have blown an excellent opportunity to consolidate on a new basis. Should he win, without the party support, there would be no basis for a rapprochement. From this standpoint, national Democratic leadership had nothing to gain and everything to lose by not supporting Washington. In supporting him, they had an opportunity to rebuild on the basis of an upsurge in mass participation among Blacks and other disaffected segments of the electorate in an all-out effort to defeat Reagan.

The Black Caucus understood this and it became easy for them to influence white Democratic leaders of the national party to put Chicago on their itinerary. And thus, a succession of Democratic politicians and hopeful candidates were paraded through Chicago to willingly "prime the pump." They had to convince white Democrats to do what Blacks had done for 50 years: be a decisive factor in support rather than the main base of support for Democratic candidates. The main obstacle was the incipient racism that had become a cornerstone of Chicago's machine politics, but which had been ignored by Democrats and historically lamented by Blacks who foresaw no other political alternative.

LOCAL REALIGNMENT AND INTRA PARTY STRUGGLE

At the local level, three developments must be singled out for analysis. First, there was the radical realignment of political elites—especially officeholders along racial electoral lines. Because of the overwhelming Black turnout for Washington, Black aldermen had to throw their support behind the Black party nominee. Since many of the machine aldermen are also ward committeemen, they had no choice but to publicly support Washington even if they privately longed for his defeat as a political reformist.

Initially, the white Democratic Party leadership was paralyzed. The primary upset had left them in search of a political center around which they could rally. While a few of the most staunch reactionaries bolted the Party and cast their support to Epton, weeks went by before Byrne attempted a short-lived "write-in" candidacy. It fizzled. With only four weeks to go before the general election, a wave of white aldermen and ward committeemen bolted the party. They openly or privately worked for the liberal, but little-known Republican, Bernard Epton, who under ordinary circumstances, would have been crushed at the polls by a united party organization and decidedly Democratic electorate. Perhaps it was the early indecisiveness among the
the regular organization leadership that prevented a united effort to increase white ethnic ward voter registration in the first weeks after Washington's primary upset. Such a campaign could have generated sufficient new voters for Epton to claim a nominal victory and for the Machine to retain control over the Mayor's office.

"Fast" Eddie Vrydolyak, the party chair, must be singled out as the center of the racist reaction to the Washington campaign. During the last weekend before the primary election, he made the clearest statement of the central issue of the campaign: racial power. In arguing before Northwest side party workers, Vrydolyak argued that the party should close ranks behind Byrne and abandon Daley, for a vote for Daley was a vote for Washington.

"After all, it's a race thing," he said.

Finally, after the Primary, Vrydolyak had procrastinated in pushing for early party unity around Washington's nomination and he convened the party central committee only after the national Democratic Party leadership made it clear that Byrne's write-in bid was to cease and the local party leadership should close ranks behind Harold Washington. This gesture of support came a full month into the seven-week-long general election period. It goes without saying that Vrydolyak is the leader of the current bloc of "29" aldermen in opposition to Washington's reform-in-government program. This group has been labeled as part of the "Cabalocrats" -- Republicans masquerading as "Democrats" within the party.

A SECOND DEVELOPMENT

A second development in the general election was the simultaneous further consolidation of the Black base of support, along with a more concerted effort to project the Washington primary campaign success as a victory for "all Chicago." On one hand, little work had to be done to sustain Black voter enthusiasm at a fever pitch--beyond injecting a healthy dose of news about the racist's tactics of the opposition. With every attack on "Harold" (be it personal, political, professional or moral), the Black community closed ranks behind "their candidate." With the tremendous influx of money and new talent into the Washington camp, a broad outreach to the White and Latino voters could be sustained. While coalition expansion continued at the "bottom" through the Task Force, and the "Unity Democrats" (Chicago's version of the "Rainbow Coalition"), the new direction was the building of a coalition of elites from the top-down. This latter development took two forms: (1) the expansion and increased visibility of the initial Steering Committee that drew heavily upon Black and white middle class ministers, professionals and business people. A secondary feature of this Steering Committee (now at 42 members) was the inclusion of more Latinos and women.25 The dominant aspect of its expansion was the increase in Black church leaders -- the main conduit for financial support for the campaign. The other aspect of "top-down" coalition development was the formation and consolidation of a dual "Transition Team" to prepare for governance.26 The Transition Team reflects the dual class character of the Washington campaign organization and administration more than any other body. Broadly defined, the full Transition body consist of some 300 people -- mainly professionals with more than 50 percent White and 35 percent Black, while 72 members of the body were women, community and labor representation was less than 5 percent. The leading bodies of the Transition Team was composed of 90 people who constituted the two major
divisions and three main functional organs of the overall Transition apparatus. The first division was called the Fact Force. Its main role was to advise on the fiscal and financial status and plan of the city. It was overwhelmingly white, corporate business executives and attorneys and corporate accountants. It is the direct connection of the Washington organization to "La Salle Street" banking insurance and corporate service organization. This group reported directly to Washington as mayor-elect and as Mayor. The second division was the Transition Oversight Committee. It coordinated the investigative, policy development and program-personnel functions through 16 (advisory) subcommittees making review and recommendations to the Transition staff and Transition Oversight Committee. In summary, the Transition Oversight Committee, whose composition was most representative of the demographic socio-economic and sectional divisions within the city, was the device by which significant sectors could make direct input into the governance process of the new administration. On the other hand, the fact that Harold Washington's electoral strategy had shifted, was indicated by the early formation of an apparent governance strategy. This strategy included creating a transition process that presented a "climate conducive to business interests" while attempting to retain a high level of legitimacy among the popular forces in the City by including significant representation of "outsiders" into the transition organization in visible ways. The degree to which the inherent contradictions will be sharpened, submerged or masked is dependent upon the extent to which an independent organized movement force would exist outside government to demand critical access to government decision making as well as holding it accountable to the people. It is significant to note that the critical tension seems not to be retained because the popular leadership has been recruited within the formal government apparatus and has not built a mass base independent of City Hall.

The third major development of the general election period was the dramatic realignments within the electorate. On one hand, the tremendous crossover of white voters to cast support for Bernard Epton--the Republican candidate, a traditionally Democratic city. And the other aspect--the truly decisive one, was the dramatic turnabout in the level of Latino support for Harold Washington. This will be detailed in the section below.

ELECTION DAY VOTER TURNOUT

Nearly 1.3 million people, 82 percent of the eligible electorate voted for the Democratic and Republican candidates on April 12. Washington received 50.06 percent (668,176) of the votes while Epton received 619,926 votes or 46.4 percent. The mobilization of the electorate along racial and nationality lines (white ethnics included) made this one of the closest local elections in the history of machine politics in Chicago. Washington carried 23 wards, two more than he carried in the Primary election. Epton carried 27 wards on the strength of the white ethnic backlash and a mass bolt from the 50-year tradition of Democratic hegemony at polls. (See Table 7 below)

While Epton carried 86 percent of the vote in predominantly white wards, (compared with 12 percent for Harold Washington), Washington garnered 98 percent of the vote in predominantly Black wards. In the traditionally liberal "Lake Front" white wards (usually carried by Democratic candidates) Epton carried 72 percent of the vote, outpolling Washington (24 percent) nearly 3 to 1. When we consider that the Lake Front wards are more racially heterogeneous, and given the pattern of Black and Latino voting (9 to 1 and 3 to 1 respectively for Washington over Epton), it is not difficult to argue that Washington received an even lower percentage of the white vote within the precincts.

If the Latino vote (discussed below) were held constant, our data indicate that the general election was even more racially polarized than the
TABLE 7

RESULTS OF MAYORAL GENERAL ELECTION,
APRIL 1983

|                    | Washington | 668,176 |  | Epton | 619,926 |  |
|--------------------|------------|---------|  |       |         |  |
| Total vote        |            | 50.06   |  |       | 46.4    |  |
| Percent           |            | 46%     |  |       | 54%     |  |
| Wards carried     |            | 98%     |  |       | 2%      |  |
| Vote in Black wards |           | 74%     |  |       | 25%     |  |
| Vote in Latino wards |         | 12%     |  |       | 86%     |  |
| Vote in White wards |           | 24%     |  |       | 72%     |  |

TABLE 8

THE HISPANIC VOTE IN THE 1983 CHICAGO MAYORAL ELECTION, BY WARD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Hispanic of Total VAP</th>
<th>VAP</th>
<th>Hispanic of Total Population</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Vote Age Population</th>
<th>Voted</th>
<th>Primary Vote for Washington</th>
<th>General Vote for Washington</th>
<th>% Increase in Vote for Washington</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td></td>
<td>25,676</td>
<td>22,698</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22,698</td>
<td>53,525</td>
<td>9,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>77%</td>
<td></td>
<td>22,698</td>
<td>20,032</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20,032</td>
<td>7,449</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>59%</td>
<td></td>
<td>19,495</td>
<td>17,079</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17,079</td>
<td>58,873</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City total</td>
<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td></td>
<td>252,077</td>
<td>237,188</td>
<td></td>
<td>237,188</td>
<td>668,176</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
vote in the Primary. In the Primary returns, the leading white candidates received an estimated 88 percent of the total white vote and 21 percent of the total Black vote. However, in the general returns, Epton captured 95 percent of the total white vote but only 2 percent of the Black vote.

If racial bloc voting was the defining characteristic of the electorate in the primary, then voting along nationality lines was a characteristic feature of the general election vote. The single most important aspect of the nationality vote was the dramatic shift in support among Latinos for Harold Washington.

THE LATINO TURNOUT AND NATIONALITY IN THE GENERAL ELECTION

Although, Washington received 74 percent of the vote in wards that are numerically dominated by Latinos, the Latino vote varied markedly along nationality lines. Puerto Ricans and Mexicans gave Washington 79 percent and 68 percent respectively while the more conservative, but smaller, Cuban electorate gave Washington only 52 percent of their total voter turnout. Despite these differences, Latinos overall, came close to voting as a bloc for Harold Washington.

The outstanding features of the Latino impact on the 1983 mayoral election are: (1) a near 20 percent increase in the Latino registrations (17,000) by March 15, bringing the overall registrations close to 100,000; (2) the increase in Latino turnout, and (3) the dramatic increase in the vote for Washington between the primary and the general election. 69 percent of the registered Latinos went to the polls for the general election -- a Chicago record. The primary, Washington received an estimated 25 percent of the combined Hispanic vote (Puerto Rican, Mexican and Cuban). In the general election, in each ward, Washington received at least 126 percent increase in support over the primary. The most dramatic increase came in the 26th ward where "Mexicanos" gave Washington an overwhelming 401 percent increase in support on the strength of 7,449 votes. (Table 8 presents our findings).

What explains this dramatic Latino turnout? Washington made a major effort to attract the Latino vote. In addition, the campaign made extensive efforts to bring Latinos into positions of visibility and responsibility within the campaign. Moreover, Washington targeted his campaign literature and program content to address the needs and aspirations of the Latino population, and presented major campaign publications in Spanish. Also, the Washington campaign undertook a newspaper project, El Independiente, a "secret weapon" that targeted the Spanish-speaking communities of Chicago. At least three issues were printed. In addition, a Latino "Blue Button" was also produced and distributed.

THE GOVERNANCE PERIOD

The first months of the Washington administration have been akin to war. In typical Chicago fashion, Rudy Luzano, a Hispanic labor leader, and staunch supporter of Washington, was murdered after the general election. In the past two elections since Daley's death, the reconciliation of the Democratic Party had been marked by the negotiation of deals that blocked Blacks from attaining a greater semblance of power and privilege by Black leaders within the Democratic Party. Such deals have not happened, since the party bosses had not supported Washington, and in many instances actively opposed his election. Washington had called for a unity breakfast after his primary and general
election victories and many principals in the losing camps did not attend.

At the inaugural, Washington broke with the precedent of a City Council chamber ceremony which could only be attended by 300-400 and held an open ceremony at Navy Pier attended by several thousands. During Washington's speech he reasserted his stand upon the movement of unity which had propelled him to victory: reform government, elimination of machine patronage, and open government without burdening the electorate with mismanagement, unfairness and inequality. Washington attacked the past practices of the machine while at the same time he promised fiscal restraint and stability in government, and sound business practices. Thus, an olive branch was being extended to the corporate business community which had given him minimal support in his primary and general election bids.29

In his Transition Team, Washington dispelled any notions that a "Black takeover" was imminent by appointing a nominal majority of whites to the Transition Team (Table 9). While more Blacks were appointed to a government Transition Team than at any time in the city's history, the most significant aspect of the policymaking structure of the early Washington governance collective is its overwhelming composition drawn from business and professional elites and political insiders.

The further working out of the economic (class) contradictions at the center of issues of urban governance has been overshadowed by the persistence, even intensification, of a virulent strain of racist reaction. A major theme in the early Washington administration has been the confrontation between Black power and the Chicago "white power structure." (Table 10). The immediate basis for the operation of Black power against the white power structure has been the result of Washington's struggle to govern. At the heart of the current
### Table 9
Social Characteristics of Officials on Transition Team Preparing for New Mayor's Administration of Harold Washington

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Characteristics</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Team (N=62)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Nationality</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community/Labor</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 10
Proportional Representation (% Black) in Chicago City Politics: Party, Council, Bureaucracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>City Council (N=50)</th>
<th>Ward Committee (N=100)</th>
<th>City Employment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 11
The Social Base of White Power vs. Black Power in the Chicago City Council: A Comparison of Factions

1. Population of Wards
   - (a) Black: 71.7
   - (b) White: 21.9
   - (c) Hispanic: 3.9
   - (d) Blue Collar: 55.7
   - (e) 4 Years College: 9.5

2. Mayoral Vote
   - (a) % Washington: 86.1
   - (b) % Epton: 13.6

Washington 21 | Vrdolyak 29
--- | ---
71.7 | 10.8
21.9 | 68.8
3.9 | 16.9
55.7 | 53.1
9.5 | 7.3
86.1 | 25.9
13.6 | 73.7
struggle between Vrydolyak (29) in City Council and the Washington administration (21) is the continuation of the struggle of Black power vs. white corporate America. This scenario tells us as much about the limitations of reformist electoral Black power strategy as it reveals its inability to provide a fundamental redistribution of social resources. All the “29” are white alderpersons and tend to be ward committeemen, and the Washington 21 is composed of all Black alderpersons and white independents with liberal or predominantly Black constituencies. (Table 11). Beyond these distinctions, past all the hype surrounding the struggle to institute reforms which target the machine, there are few substantive bases for unity. Thus, on many class-based issues we can expect fragmentation within both camps along the lines of material incentives and resource redistribution.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

In general, we have attempted to base this analysis on the objective development of the historical forces that led to the campaign, and the social character of the campaign itself. Indeed, this campaign will be discussed as a permanent event in Black political history, and the history of Chicago. Our contribution in this paper is to provide the essential facts in an organized manner. Further, we believe this campaign should be studied to understand at least three major points:

1. Black adults demonstrated that under specific conditions they will defy all expectations and mobilize at unprecedented levels. These conditions are unity of Black leadership, public attacks from white racism, and a legitimate form of mobilization such as voting.

2. Racism, nationality and class dynamics were operative factors explaining the Harold Washington election and fueling the dialectical, political process of unity building over all three stages of the mayoral politics process that moved a Black into City Hall in 1983.

3. The dynamic tension between coalition development on the inside of the political structure and coalition development among movement forces using resources outside the system was a movement of convergence of forces which witnessed its principal aspect shift in the build-up primary, general and governance stages of the process.

4. During the first two stages, clearly the movement forces had the ascendency (concrete struggles and community issues, boycott of Chicago Fest, mass voter registration, the formation of the Task Force, etc). During the general election, a tedious balance was struck between the movement forces which sustained the mobilization and a transition apparatus which move clearly was composed of elements who main base and orientation was from within system structures. During the governance phase we see a decided trend, beneath all the public calamity and rhetoric omitting from the conflict between the “Vrydolyak 29” and “Washington 21” in City Council that the movement forces are taking their lead from City Hall rather than defining the context of struggle and the terrain of battle.

5. At this point, the most progressive aspect of the current struggle has been the movement of the struggle into the wards in an attempt by populist-reformist to unseat ward committeemen and old guard politicians in the March primaries that open the presidential electoral season in Illinois. Other efforts to establish and consolidate independent bases of power and movement resources have been feeble to this point.

6. The tremendous unity built up among the masses within the electorate during the mayoral election has been declinized by subsequent political developments which mainly affect the Black community: a) the struggle in the First Congressional District to replace Harold Washington was conducted in such a way that it accelerated greater disunity and blurred the vision of the popular forces who had contributed to a major victory and step forward for the movement in Chicago; and b) the utter confusion around the Jesse Jackson candidacy has contributed to further political fragmentation without the benefit of greater political clarity and sense of direction.

In Chicago, decades of electoral political participation on the part of the Black community, its political leadership and movement activists, have resulted in some substantial political gains: relative proportional representation in the City Council, substantial representation on major political boards and commissions and a Black man occupying the “Fifth Floor” of City Hall were
merely fantastic visions in the previous decade. In Chicago, Blacks had historically exhausted the limitations of the symbolic representation offered them by the Republican Party, the decades of struggle within the Democratic Machine produced substantial gains and the emergence of the Black electorate as the pivotal force in City politics. The Washington mayoral victory and the subsequent power struggle within government and the later treachery of the Democratic Party elite have brought Blacks, progressive whites and a growing Latino electorate to a critical threshold of political action and to the brink of a decisive break with the Democratic Party. 30

What then is the logical progression of the movement in Chicago and its implications for struggle elsewhere in the country?

For our ongoing analysis, we have drawn out five important questions for study and critical debate. We have simply stated them in a popular way below:

1. What does the Chicago mayoral mean for building Black unity?
2. What are the prospects for building multinational unity (i.e., Rainbow Coalition rooted in local struggle, etc.)?
3. Can Jesse Jackson's campaign replicate on the national level, the Washington election/movement?
4. What happened to the white left?
5. Can electoral politics free Black people or are we ever going to straighten out this mess?
FOOTNOTES

1. This article is an adaptation of a draft paper prepared initially as a discussion document. It represents our first attempt to identify the logic of the dynamic events which unfolded during the election campaign of Harold Washington in Chicago. Our work on this event in Chicago is part of much larger research analysis, and publications project focusing in "the Development of Black Power in Chicago" in an effort to contribute to the ongoing discussions focused upon Black Liberation and the Crisis of the (U.S.) Capitalist State.

The general importance of this election can be easily seen in the newspaper coverage in Chicago and other parts of the world. The primary and general election coverage has been collected in two documentary volumes published by People's College Press (P.O. Box 2696, Chicago, IL, USA 60680), Black Power in Chicago: Volume 1. A Documentary Survey of the 1983 Mayoral Democratic Primary; Volume 2. The General Election. Some headlines from the European press are as follows: "Le Monde in Paris, "Un Noir a ete elu pour la premiere fois maire de Chicago:" Die Zeit in Berlin, "Ein Schwarzer Kandidat Schlagt die Bürgermeisterin aus dem Feld:" and The Times of London, "Black Vote Wins Chicago: Mayor Tries to Heal Racial Rift."

The general historical development of the U.S. capitalist city can be traced in the following:


Basic works on the history of Chicago include:

Bessie Louise Pierce, A History of Chicago, Volume 1, 1673-1848; Volume 2, 1848-1871; Volume 3, 1871-1893 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1957);

Harold Mayer and Richard Wade, Chicago: Growth of a Metropolis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909);

Milo Quafe, Chicago: From Indian Village to Modern City, 1673-1835 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933).

The sources for data used in this study are part of a large, comprehensive collection of materials produced by the Mayoral Campaign, the news media and commentary on Chicago politics. This material is accessible by contacting the authors on any particular question of fact germane to this study.
2. Donald S. Bradley, The Historical Trends of the Political-Elites in a Metropolitan Central City: The Chicago Mayors (Working Paper #10, Center for Organizational Studies, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, May 1963); also


Eighty-eight of the "Fortune 1000" leading corporations are headquartered in the Chicago area. Six of the top 100 banks and insurance companies are located in Chicago; three major international transportation leaders are headquartered in Chicago, including United Airlines; three leading international industrial firms are based in Chicago, including Standard Oil of Indiana, Beatrice Foods, Inland Steel; two major diversified products companies, Esmark and I.C Industries. Three of the leading retail chain operations, include Sears, Jewell Companies and McDonald's. One of the major utilities in the world, Commonwealth Edison, is based in Chicago. O'Hare International Airport is one of the most trafficked airports in the world. Chicago is a major electronic media outlet (NBC, Chicago Tribune, Sun Times). It is further noted that 34 of the 100 largest multinational conglomerates in the U.S. are based in Chicago. The list of multinational corporations with direct investments in South Africa include: First National Bank, Continental Bank, American Hospital Supply, Borg-Warner, Searls, International Harvester, Abbott, and Motorola. Chicago has three major universities with over $15 million in investments in major corporations doing business in South Africa and/or with direct investments in the exploitation of South African workers. Northwestern, $75 million; University of Chicago, $50 million; Illinois Institute of Technology, $15 million. See Fortune Magazine 1982 and 1983 annual corporate surveys, Forbes July 5, 1982; also Chicago Committee for a Free Africa, Sell the Stock: The Divestiture Struggle at Northwestern University and Building the Anti-Imperialist Movement (Chicago: People's College Press, 1978).

4. Wilson, op. cit.

5. The general development of Black politics in Chicago is discussed in the forthcoming proceedings of a major conference of academics and activists held during the primary campaign. Black Mayors and American Cities (Chicago: People's College Press, forthcoming).

6. Milton Rakove, Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers: An Insider's Analysis of the Daley Machine (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976);

7. Royko, ibid; See also:

8. Rakove, op. cit.

9. While not discussed in this article, we believe that attention should be given to the analysis of several sets of substantive and representational issues which provided the immediate background to the Chicago mayoral election. These mass issues were important because it was the leadership...
of various constituents involved in these concrete struggles who linked their morale and interests up with leadership elements from across the city. They developed a consensus around the key issues, the target of struggle—City Hall symbolized by Jane Byrne, built a movement in opposition to Byrne at her support base and finally steered their respective constituencies into a broad social movement whose initial political expression was the tremendous voter registration drive of the Fall of 1982. Finally it was the leadership element among these grassroots forces who played the major role in building the consensus around Harold Washington as "their own candidate" for mayor to replace the discredited Jane Byrne and repudiated the Machine.

11. Official voter registration records are available from the Cook County Board of Election Commissioners, Chicago: City Hall, 1982, 1983.
12. Ibid.
13. It was widely projected that this high turnout in the November 2 general election represented the orchestration of a resurgence of the Cook County Regular Democratic Party by Chairman Eddie Vrdolyak rather than an independent upsurge based in the Black community. See "Huge Voter Turnout Enhances (Washington) Vrdolyak Bid," Chicago Defender, November 4, 1982; also the summary analysis articles of the effects of the gubernatorial turnout on the mayoral race in the Sun Times and Tribune, November 3-4, 1982.
14. The Byrne record in opposition to the issues of immediate concern in Blacks is documented in the local Black press, the Chicago Defender and the Chicago Metro News. Also, Lu Palmer, the noted Black journalist, has retained the commentaries used in his radio program, "Lu's Notebook," see Lu's Notebook (Chicago: Lu Palmer Foundation, Summer-Fall, 1982); see "Jane Byrne: Displaying a New Maturity," Sun Times, November 7, 1982.
17. A preliminary analysis of the correlation between racial distribution and vote for Harold Washington in the primary and general election has been undertaken by Ken Janda at Northwestern University. In the analysis of word data Janda found very high correlations (+.96) between percentage of Black ward population and percentage of vote for Harold Washington in both elections. The same analysis holds true (+.94) provided the Latino vote is controlled. Janda found the most significant reversal was the dramatic shift in support for Washington among Latino wards in the general election. See K. Janda, "Notes on the Chicago Primary Vote," Vox Pop. APSA Newsletter Subfield Political Organizations/Parties, Vol. 2 (Winter, 1983) and "More notes on the 1983 Chicago Mayoral Election," Vox Pop, Vol. 2:2 (Spring, 1983). "Board of Election Commissioners" Official report on the February 22, 1983 primary elections and various supplemental tallies, March 4, 1983.
18. The conclusions are based upon the recent study of the relations between ethnicity and religion and politics, sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, "Chicago Elects a Black Mayor: An Historical Analysis of the 1983 Election," a research report edited by Paul Kleppner, Office for Social Science Research, Northern Illinois University, for the American Jewish Committee (Chicago: 55 East Jackson Blvd., Chicago, IL 60004, July 1983). Also see:
"Primary Elections Returns," Board of Election Commissioners, op. cit.
19. Peoples College, Black Power in Chicago, Vol. I, Introduction. Each stage of the Washington campaign has not been fully elaborated within this paper; however, the periodization scheme, first presented in Black Power in Chicago, provides a context for unfolding a developing analysis of the Washington campaign organization. This framework will be more fully articulated in subsequent publications as products of research currently being undertaken.
20. The existence of the Task Force for Black Political Empowerment represented the consolidation of institutional/organizational leadership and the mobilization of Black community resources solidly behind Washington's campaign bid. The extensiveness of the Black community support base Washington serves as a reflection of the view of Milton Rakove, a machine apologist, that the Black community still lacked sufficient resources and institutional support mechanisms to make a successful Black mayorality bid possible. Rakove, a frequent contributor to the Chicago Sun Times and Chicago Tribune, is the author of Don't Make Jakes, Don't Get Back No Losers, and We Don't Want Nobody Song, two impressionistic histories focused upon the Chicago machine during the Daley years; also H. Preston op. cit.
21. See, "National demos to Byrne: 'Back Washington!'," Sun Times, March 23, 1983 also,
22. This is partially explained by the concept of "cross pressures," when a person belongs to two or more groups pulling in different directions. See Berelson, et al., Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).
23. For background on Eddie Vrdolyak, see the pamphlet Stop Fast Eddie, available from Temple Books (P.O. Box 7696, Chicago, IL 60607).
24. Between May and August 1983, the All Chicago City News published a feature highlighting what the newspaper's editors term "Caballeros," Republicans who had been masquerading as Democrats within the Democratic Party. Of course, the root term has its origins in the 1979 campaign when Jane Byrne charged that these same party leaders were a "cabal of evil men." After being elected mayor, Byrne made her peace with the "cabal" who continued to lord over the local Democratic Party organization.


27. This date is drawn from the official returns available at the Cook County Board of Election Commissioners, April, 1983. The Kleppner study, op. cit., represents the first published attempt to assess ethnicity as a factor in the election. Wanda (op. cit.) attempts to focus upon the comparative role of nationality (Latino) in the primary and the general election returns.


29. From the 1983 Mayoral Inaugural Address of Harold Washington; the full text appears in the Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, April 29, 1983, City of Chicago City Clerk's Office; Chicago Sun Times (April 29, 1983).

30. See Stokley Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton (1967), Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America. In this book, the strategy of Black power stripped of its militant rhetoric reveals an essentially reformist content. Black leaders would be willing to limit the aspirations and interests of Blacks to a proportionate share of the action rather than a radical redistribution of social wealth based upon egalitarian or socialist principles.

31. We have continued to collect information on the Washington election and his subsequent administration. Included in this material is a regular, ongoing, newsclipping project. Moreover, we have continued to monitor Chicago politics and the social protest movement in order to provide the basis for a continuous assessment of Chicago political dynamics as they unfold.